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11. Introduction
More than ten years after Re-Uni¯cation the situation on the labour markets in West and East Germany still
di®ers enormously. This becomes obvious when looking at the unemployment rate in 2001 which was 7.4% in
West Germany and 17.5% in the East. To overcome this unemployment problem, active labour market policies
(ALMP) are regarded as a suitable measure. Therefore it is not surprising that the Federal Employment Agency
(FEA) spends signi¯cant resources on these measures. The most important ones are vocational training (VT)
and job creation schemes (JCS).
Since 1998 the new legal basis for ALMP is the Social Code (SGB III) which has replaced the Work Support Act
from 1969. Changes have been made not only in the objectives, like a more intensive focus on problem groups of
the labour market, but also in the institutional organisation of labour market policy, leading to decentralisation
and more °exibility in the regional allocation of resources to di®erent measures. The local employment o±ces
are now allowed to allocate their budgets relatively freely to di®erent measures to adjust the policies to the
situation on the local labour markets. Typically, in situations with great imbalances in the labour market JCS
are preferred to training measures, whereas in areas with low unemployment rates hardly any JCS are started.
Consequently, JCS play a much bigger role in the East than in the West. Whereas in West Germany the number
of entries into VT is four times higher than the number of entries in JCS, this ratio is nearly equal in the East.
Up to now, evaluation of JCS has been constricted due to an unsatisfactory data situation. Only a few studies
evaluating the microeconomic e®ects of JCS exist and they all focus on the labour market in East Germany.1
Due to this and the small sample sizes in the analyses, the use of the results for general policy conclusions is
problematic. But with the introduction of the SGB III a mandatory output evaluation of active labour market
policies has been introduced and simultaneously the data situation has improved signi¯cantly.
Our paper presents a microeconometric evaluation of JCS in Germany, focussing on the e®ects on the partici-
pating individuals and taking account of several sources of heterogeneity. The estimation is based on a dataset
merged from di®erent administrative sources of the FEA. It contains information on all participants in JCS who
started their programmes in February 2000, that is 11,376 individuals. The control group consists of 232,399
individuals who met the institutional conditions for participation in JCS in January 2000. The pool of available
variables can be di®erentiated into four categories: Socio-demographic, quali¯cation and career information as
well as regional context-variables to take account of the situation on the local labour market.
1For an overview of these studies see Hujer and Caliendo (2001).
2Microeconometric evaluation is generally plagued by the fundamental evaluation problem. That is, one has to
make inference about the outcome that would have been observed for participants had they not participated.
To overcome this counterfactual situation, identifying assumptions have to be invoked which are generally
untestable. The most common assumption in this context is the conditional independence assumption (see e.g.
Rubin (1977)), which requires that treatment participation and treatment outcomes are independent condi-
tional on a set of observable characteristics X. Since conditioning on all relevant covariates is limited in case
of a high dimensional vector X (`curse of dimensionality'), the use of so-called balancing scores is proposed.
The exhaustive and informative dataset at hand does justify the application of a matching estimator which
exploits CIA but avoids almost any other assumption (Lechner (2002b)). The basic idea underlying it is to
replace the counterfactual outcome of the participants by the outcome of a selected group of `comparable'
non-participants. Besides being an intuitively appealing approach and therefore easy to communicate to policy
makers, the matching approach avoids functional form assumptions and allows the e®ects to be di®erent in
speci¯c sub-populations (individual heterogeneity). Furthermore in its multiple-treatment version (see Lechner
(2001) and Imbens (2000)) it allows to take account of the fact that the evaluated programmes are not homo-
geneous. Heterogeneity can arise between di®erent programmes like JCS and vocational training (programme
heterogeneity) but also in di®erent sectors within the same programme (sectoral heterogeneity). The latter case
is important for us, since the sub-parts of the analysed JCS are very diverse regarding their type of occupation
(e.g. `Construction & Industry' vs. `O±ce & Services'), intensity and duration. As we additionally expect the
e®ects to be di®erent for di®erent strata of the population, e.g. long-term unemployed or young unemployed and
¯nally also regional and gender-speci¯c di®erences are important, matching seems to be a suitable approach.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: At ¯rst we will give an overview of the institutional setup
and instruments of ALMP in Germany. Following that we will describe the dataset and compare the participants
in the di®erent sectors of JCS with the non-participants. In section 4 we will outline the general framework
for the microeconometric evaluation and present the matching estimator used in this study. In the empirical
analysis in the subsequent section we describe the implementation of the estimator, present results and draw
some policy conclusions. Finally, we summarise and give an outlook for further research.
32. Institutional Setup and Instruments
The main purpose of this paper is to answer the question if JCS enhance the labour market prospects of the
participating individuals. To understand the e®ects of the di®erent types of programmes and the composition
of the participating individuals, we will ¯rst review the labour market situation as well as the institutional
environment of these programmes.
2.1. One Country { Two Labour Markets
A persistent unemployment rate in connection with high expenses for labour market policies characterises
the German labour market of the last two decades. However, talking of `the' German labour market might
be misleading due to the special situation of the re-uni¯ed Germany after 1990. As a legacy of the former
countries, the regional labour markets in western and eastern Germany di®er substantially. From 1990 until
1993 the eastern labour market was characterised by an enormous employment reduction from about 9.75 million
jobs down to 6.25 million. Besides the structural crisis due to the collapse of the Command Economy, problems
arose through di±culties in the adoption of the new economical and behavioural situation. As a consequence,
the stock of unemployed increased. However, because of a massive deployment of active labour market and
social policy measures, a strong migration and a high number of commuters to the western part, there were
only about 1.15 million workers openly unemployed on yearly average. In the years between 1993 and 1995,
after this 'Re-Uni¯cation-Shock', the eastern labour market was stabilised and recovered slightly. This was
mainly driven by a higher demand in the construction business. Since 1996, however, the situation is declining
again. While the number of jobs has decreased in the following years, the stock of unemployed has risen up to
1.37 million. Although these ¯gures represent the persistent problems of the eastern labour market, there were
also some positive developments, like a good progress in setting-up a more competitive economic environment
and modernising the economy. The transformation is processing still, and a quick convergence is not expected.
While the eastern labour market su®ered from the Re-Uni¯cation, the western labour market boomed. The
labour force rose both by the immigrants from the eastern part and abroad. Together with a strong increase of
employment between 1989 and 1992, the number of unemployed was reduced to 1.80 million. In the years from
1993 to 1997 the western German labour market was a®ected by an economic slowdown, a delayed e®ect of the
global recession determined by the oil-price shock during and after the Gulf War. In contrast to the eastern part,
typical attributes of the economy and the labour market in the western part are a strong export-dependence
4Table 1: The two labour markets in Germany
West East
Year 2000 2001 2000 2001
Employment (in million people)1 32.120 32.486 6.406 6.287
Unemployment (in million people)1 2.529 2.478 1.359 1.374
Unemployment Rate 7.8% 7.4% 17.4% 17.5%
Entries into Vocational Training 337,880 261,199 213,654 188,423
Entries into Job Creation Schemes 78,684 61,890 181,395 130,147
Spending on
Passive Labour Market Policies (in bn Euro) 24.09 24.91 13.71 13.86
Active Labour Market Policies (in bn Euro) 12.23 12.42 9.77 9.89
Vocational Training (in bn Euro) 4.06 4.19 2.75 2.80
Job Creation Schemes (in bn Euro) 1.02 0.86 2.66 2.11
1 on yearly average
Source: Bundesanstalt fÄ ur Arbeit (2001), Bundesanstalt fÄ ur Arbeit (2002)
due to production of superior industrial goods and an expanding services-sector. In these years unemployment
rose heavily up to 3.02 million in the yearly average. In the end of the 1990s the western German labour market
recovered. Between 1997 and 2000 the number of unemployed decreased again but was still persistent on a level
around 2.5 million.
In the ¯rst half of the year 2000 the German economy had the biggest upswing since the Re-Uni¯cation. Despite
this, only the western labour market with its strong export-dependence pro¯ted. The higher foreign demand did
not a®ect the eastern part because of its minor importance in the export-sector. Furthermore, the continuing
structural problems and a reduced demand in the construction sector led to a negative outcome. Since the
second half of the year 2000, the German economy experiences a new downswing. Consequently, unemployment
rose again in both parts. Even though the ¯gures in table 1 show a reduced number of unemployed and a
reduced unemployment rate for western Germany in the yearly average for the year 2001, this is only due to
the reduced stock of unemployed in the beginning of 2001 resulting from the upswing in the ¯rst half of 2000.
2.2. Active Labour Market Policies and Job Creation Schemes
The unsatisfying situation of the persistently increasing unemployment linked with a strained budget situation
led to a re-orientation of labour market policy. Mainly ALMP have become more important during the last
years. The reform of the Work Support Act (ArbeitsfÄ orderungsgesetz) in 1997/1998 to the Social Code III
(Sozialgesetzbuch III) re°ects this fact. A higher emphasis on °exibility and decentralisation of the labour
market policy should enable a more e±cient application of the instruments for the target groups as well as
a higher self dependence of the local placement o±cers. The primary objective of ALMP in Germany is still
5the (re-) integration of unemployed into regular employment. The main purpose of the employment promotion
according to the Social Code III is to balance labour demand and supply. Unemployment should be circumvented
by an e±cient ¯lling of vacancies and the increase of the individual employment chances due to an upgrade of
the worker's human capital. Besides those explicit postulations of the legislator for the design of the labour
market policy, the evaluation of the success of the instruments is now legally anchored. The analysis of the
e®ects of ALMP is now a focus of labour market research in Germany. The purpose is a more contemporary
evaluation of the di®erent instruments, considering aspects like the net-e®ect on the employment chances for
an individual, the identi¯cation of macroeconomic e®ects and cost-bene¯t analysis.
Spending for ALMP amounts to more than 33.2% of the total expenditures for labour market policy in West
Germany and 41.6% in East Germany in 2001. The main instruments are VT and subsidised employment.
VT consists of several on-the-job and o®-the-job measures for unemployed and workers who are threatened by
unemployment. The costs for these measures lie at 6.99 billion Euro and 449,622 individuals started training
in 2001. On second place regarding the expenses and the number of entries are the JCS with a ¯scal volume of
2.97 billion Euro and 192,037 newly promoted individuals in 2001 (Bundesanstalt fÄ ur Arbeit, 2002). JCS can
be promoted if they support activities which are of value for the society and additional in nature.2 Furthermore
individuals have to be employed whose last chance to stabilise and qualify for later re-integration into regular
employment is participation in these schemes. Additional in nature means that the activities could not be
executed without the subsidy. Measures with a predominantly commercial purpose have been excluded explicitly
up to January 2002; now they can be accomplished with a special permission by the administration board of the
local labour o±ce. Participants on JCS are allowed to do a practical training up to 40% of the time and a VT
up to 20%, together no more than 50% of the programme duration. Priority should be given to projects which
enhance the chances for permanent jobs, support structural improvement in social or environmental services or
aim at the integration of extremely hard-to-place individuals.
Even though JCS are mainly accomplished by public and social institutions, they could also be organised by
the private sector if some special clauses to prevent substitution e®ects and windfall gains are regarded. Besides
the social value and the additional bene¯t of the activities, participants in JCS in the private sector should be
from special target groups of the labour market, e.g. young unemployed without professional training, and get
educational supervision during occupation.
2See xx 260-271 and 416 in the Social Code III (SGB III) for details.
6The legal requirements for individuals to enter JCS are relaxed by the SGB III amendment (Job-Aqtiv-Gesetz)
in January 2002. Before that time, potential participants had to be long-term unemployed (more than one
year) or unemployed for at least six months within the last twelve months. Additionally they had to ful¯l the
conditions for the entitlement of unemployment compensation.3 In addition, the local placement o±cers were
allowed to place up to ¯ve percent of the allocated individuals who do not meet these conditions (Five-Percent-
Quota). Further exceptions are made for young unemployed (under 25 years) without professional training,
short-term unemployed (with at least three months of unemployment) placed as tutors, and disabled who could
be stabilised or quali¯ed.
With the 2002 amendment, all unemployed individuals can enter a JCS independent of the preceding unem-
ployment duration, but with the restriction that JCS is the only opportunity for occupation. In addition, the
Five-Percent-Quota was augmented up to ten percent. The subsidy is normally paid for 12 months, but can
be extended up to 24 or even 36 months, if it is followed by regular employment. Even though JCS should be
co-¯nanced measures where between 30% and 75% of the costs are subsidies by the FEA and the rest is paid
by the supporting institution (public or private legal entities, mainly municipalities), exceptions can be made
in the direction of a higher subsidy-quota (up to 100%).
Participation in JCS results from placement by the local labour o±ce. Unemployed individuals who cannot be
integrated into regular employment or do not ¯t the conditions for another instrument of active labour market
policy are o®ered a place in JCS. JCS can be implemented in nine di®erent sectors. Since the de¯nition of this
sector-structure comes from the mid 1980s, the changes due to the Re-Uni¯cation, the new orientation of the
labour market policy and the labour environment in the 1990s and 2000s are not regarded. In our study we
focus on the main four sectors `Agriculture', `Construction & Industry', `O±ce & Services' and `Community
Services'. The rest is summarised in the sector `Other'. In the placement process the unemployed individual is
o®ered a speci¯c job in one measure where a place is available and which ¯ts his characteristics. The placement
o±cer can cancel the treatment before the regular end if the participating individual can be placed in the ¯rst
labour market. If an unemployed rejects the o®er of a JCS or if a participant denies a career counselling by the
3There are two kinds of unemployment compensation in Germany. The ¯rst kind are unemployment bene¯ts (UB) that are paid
dependent on the preceding duration of employment, the age and if the individual has children. To get UB, an individual must
register unemployed at the local labour o±ce, seek for a regular occupation and have worked in regular employment before. The
UB amounts to 60% (67%) of the net-wage of the last occupation for unemployed without (with) children. The longest possible UB
entitlement is 32 months. After expiration of the UB entitlement, unemployed can gain unemployment assistance (UA) if they are
in need of further promotion. In analogy to the UB entitlement, the UA di®ers dependent on having or not having children. The
amount of UA for persons without (with) children is 53% (57%) of the last net-wage. The UA is paid for one year at maximum,
but can be prolonged by case-wise revision. For every following year the grants are paid on a p.a. 3% reduced last net-income
basis. Participation in a job creation scheme prolongs the entitlement for UB in the same way as regular employment.
7placement o±cer, the labour o±ce can stop the unemployment bene¯ts for up to twelve weeks. However, due
to legal restrictions the use of this penalty is negligible.
3. Dataset and Descriptive Analysis
Data Base The empirical analysis is based on a data set matched from several administrative data sources of
the FEA. The central source of information used is a prototype version of the programme participants master
data set (Ma¼nahmeteilnehmergrunddatei, MTG). This data set includes information on all participants in
subsidised employment in Germany. The attributes are taken from three separate data sources of the FEA,
the job-seekers data base (BewA), an adjusted version of this source for statistical purposes (ST4) and the
participants' data base of subsidised employment (ST11TN). The MTG contains a large number of attributes
to describe several individual aspects that can be split into four classes: socio-demographic and quali¯cation
information, labour market history and particular programme information. To describe the regional context we
used the employment o±ces' data base (ST1VOR). Table 2 gives detailed information of the data sources and
the included attributes.
Table 2: Data Sources and Attributes
Data Source Attributes
MTG1 BewA and ST42 a) socio-demographic: age, gender, marital status, number of chil-
dren, nationality, handicap
b) quali¯cation: graduation, professional training, occupational
group, position in last occupation, work experience, appraisal of
quali¯cation by the placement o±cer
c) labour market history: duration of unemployment, duration of
last occupation, number of job o®ers, occupational rehabilitation,
programme participation before unemployment
ST11TN3 d) programme: supporter of programme, activity sector, share of
quali¯cation and practical training in programme, begin and end
of programme, entry and leaving of the participant, duration of
promotion
ST1VOR4 e) regional context: number of inhabitants in employment o±ce's
area, unemployment rate, number of unemployment, number of va-
cancies, underemployment rate
1 Programme participants master data set (Ma¼nahmeteilnehmergrunddatei, MTG)
2 Job-seekers data base (Bewerberangebotsdatei, BewA) and adjusted version for statistical purposes (ST4)
3 Programme participants of subsidized employment data set (ST11TN)
4 Data set containing labour o±ce information (ST1VOR)
Our analysis builds on a sample from the MTG of all 11,376 participants who entered JCS in February 2000.
Only the ¯rst programme participation is evaluated, any participation in later programmes, e.g. VT, is viewed
8as an outcome of the ¯rst treatment.4 The comparison group consists of 232,399 individuals who met the
institutional conditions for participation in JCS in January 2000, but did not enter those schemes in the
observation period, which is mainly caused by the limited availability of slots in JCS. The sample was drawn
from the job-seekers data base and the attributes from the ST4 were added. The unemployment status of all
individuals was tracked until March 2002.
Descriptive Analysis Tables A.1 and A.2 in the appendix show selected descriptive statistics of the par-
ticipants in the ¯ve programme sectors and for the group of non-participants measured in January 2000. Het-
erogeneity with respect to programme and individual characteristics becomes obvious by these statistics. For
instance, the average duration of unemployment before programme participation varies in the ¯ve sectors and
also between East and West Germany. Individuals who participate in programmes in the `Community Services'
sector have the shortest duration of unemployment in West Germany with 53.1 weeks on average, in East
Germany these are the participants in the `Construction & Industry' sector (53.1 weeks). In both regions the
longest duration of unemployment are found for participants in `Agriculture' (West: 66.8, East: 64.1 weeks).
The duration of unemployment of the non-participants is notably longer than for the participants. This might
be due to a higher willingness of the participants or re°ect the fact that there is only a limited number of places
in programmes available. Clearly, one task of the matching approach is to ¯nd comparable non-participants in
terms of unemployment duration. Besides the varying average duration of unemployment before programme
participation also the programme duration varies. Longest promotion is given in the services' sectors (`O±ce &
Services', `Community Services'), where particularly higher quali¯ed individuals work.
The placement of participants seems to be oriented on the individual skills. Whereas the biggest group of
participants in `Agriculture' and `Construction & Industry' comes from manufacturing, the services sectors are
dominated by service professions. The quali¯cation level of participants is very low on average. Apart from the
services in East and West, the quota of individuals without professional training and without CSE is higher
than in the group of non-participants. Consequently, the group of non-skilled workers as a professional rank is,
apart from the services sectors, larger in the participants' group compared to the non-participants.
Furthermore, there are interesting regional di®erences in JCS. The average age of participants is about six
to nine years higher in East Germany than in West Germany. Women are higher represented in the eastern
part. Here, particularly in `Community Services' and `O±ce & Services' there are 81.4% and 76.3% female
4See Lechner and Miquel (2001) for an approach to evaluate dynamic programme sequences.
9participants. In contrast, the proportion of women in West Germany in `Agriculture' and `Construction &
Industry' amounts only to 7.4% and 9.4%.
The underemployment rate in the labour o±ce district can be interpreted as an indicator for the condition of the
regional labour market.5 The ¯gures portray the special situation of the labour market in Germany (see above).
While the majority of the labour o±ce districts in West Germany has an underemployment rate between 7.5%
to 15.0%, for East Germany it lies between 22.5% to 30%.
4. Methodology
4.1. General Framework
The standard model in the microeconometric evaluation literature is the potential outcome approach or Roy(1951)-
Rubin(1974)-model. In this model an individual can choose between two states, e.g. either participating in a
certain labour market programme or not. The individual has then two potential outcomes, where Y 1 is a
situation with treatment and Y 0 is a situation without treatment. If we use D 2 f0;1g as a binary treatment
indicator, the actually observed outcome for any individual i can be written as: Yi = Y 1
i ¢D+(1¡D)¢Y 0
i . Since
we cannot observe the same individual in both states at the same time, we have to to deal with a counterfactual
situation and the so-called fundamental evaluation problem. The parameter which receives most attention in
the evaluation literature is the `average treatment e®ect on the treated' (ATET), that is: E[Y 1 ¡ Y 0jD = 1].
Estimating this e®ect requires to make inference about the outcome that would have been observed for par-
ticipants had they not participated. In social experiments where eligible persons are randomly denied access
to the programme, the randomised-out control group provides a direct estimate of E[Y 0jD = 1], whereas in
non-experimental studies no such direct estimate is available (Smith and Todd (2004)).
When evaluating the active labour market policies of countries, researchers are usually not confronted with only
one homogeneous programme but with a variety of di®erent ones, e.g. wage subsidies, training programmes or
JCS. Even when looking at one speci¯c programme, like in our case JCS, the sub-parts of the programme may
be very heterogeneous regarding the type of occupation, intensity, duration, etc. To account for programme
heterogeneity, the standard evaluation framework has been extended by Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001).
The multiple treatment framework considers the case of (M + 1) mutually di®erent and exclusive treatments
5The underemployment rate is de¯ned as the sum of openly unemployed and programme participants in relation to the labour
force.
10instead of just two. For every individual only one component of the M +1 di®erent outcomes fY 0;Y 1;:::;Y Mg
can be observed, leaving M as counterfactuals. Participation in treatment m is indicated by S 2 f0;1;:::;Mg.
An important concept in this framework is the stable unit-treatment value assumption (SUTVA)6 , which
requires that the potential outcomes of an individual depend on his own participation only and not on the
treatment status of other individuals. Furthermore, whether an individual participates or not does not depend
on the participation decision of other individuals. The latter requirement excludes peer-e®ects, whereas the
¯rst one excludes cross-e®ects or general equilibrium e®ects (Sianesi (2004)).
The interest lies in the causal e®ect of one treatment relative to another treatment on an outcome variable.
Even though Lechner (2001) de¯nes several interesting parameters, we will focus on the ATET.7 In the multiple-
treatment notation that e®ect is de¯ned as a pair-wise comparison of the e®ects of the treatments m and l for
an individual randomly drawn of participants in m only:
µml
0 = E(Y m ¡ Y l j S = m) = E(Y m j S = m) ¡ E(Y l j S = m): (1)
It is worth noting that this treatment e®ect is not symmetric if the participants in m and l di®er in a non-random
fashion which is related to the outcomes. In the presented framework the causal treatment e®ect is generally
not identi¯ed. To overcome the counterfactual situation identifying assumptions have to be invoked which are
generally untestable. The most common assumption in this context is the conditional independence assumption
(see e.g. Rubin (1977)), which requires that treatment participation and treatment outcomes are independent
conditional on a set of observable characteristics X.8 Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001) consider identi¯cation
under CIA in the multiple treatment framework and formalise it in the following way:
Y 0;Y 1;:::;Y M q S j X = x;8x 2 Â:9 (2)
That is, all potential treatment outcomes are independent of the assignment mechanism for any given value of
a vector of attributes, X, in an attribute space, Â (Lechner (2002a)). For this assumption to be ful¯lled, the
researcher has to observe all characteristics that jointly in°uence the participation decision and the outcomes
and therefore its plausibility depends on the dataset at hand. Assumption (2) is too restrictive if the parameter
of interest is the mean e®ect of treatment on the treated, since in that case conditional mean independence
6See Rubin (1980) or Holland (1986) for a further discussion of this concept.
7Other parameters of interest are e.g. the average treatment e®ect of treatment m relative to treatment l for persons randomly
drawn from the population or randomly drawn from participants in either m or l.
8These variables are una®ected by treatment and called attributes by Holland (1986).
9This identifying assumption is termed `strong unconfoundness' by Imbens (2000).
11su±ces (Smith and Todd (2004)). However, Lechner (2002b) argues that the CIA has the virtue of identifying
the mean e®ects for all transformations of the outcome variables and furthermore it will be di±cult to argue
why conditional mean independence should hold and CIA might still be violated in empirical studies.
Conditioning on all relevant covariates is, however, limited in case of a high dimensional vector X ('curse of
dimensionality'). Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show for the single treatment case that it is not necessary
to condition on X, but instead it is su±cient to use so-called balancing scores, i.e. functions of the relevant
observed covariates. A balancing score b(X) is a function of X, such that conditional on it, the characteristics
X are balanced across the groups, i.e. S q X j b(X).
The propensity score Pm(X), i.e. the probability of participating in a programme, is one possible balancing
score. It summarises the information of the observed covariates into a single index function. Lechner (2001)
shows that a generalisation of the balancing score property holds for the case of multiple treatments as well:
Y 0;Y 1;:::;Y M q S j X = x ! Y 0;Y 1;:::;Y M q S j b(X) = b(x);8x 2 Â:10 (3)
Given that, the ATET (here: e®ect of treatment m compared with treatment l on the participants in treatment
m) can be written as (Lechner (2002a)):
µml
0 = E(Y m j S = m) ¡ EP ljml[EfY l j Pljml(X);S = lg j S = m]; (4)
where: Pljml(x) = Pljml(S = l j S 2 l;m;X = x) =
Pl(x)
Pl(x) + Pm(x)
:
The marginal probability of treatment j conditional on X is denoted as P(S = j j X = x) = Pj(x). µml
0 is
identi¯ed and the dimension of the estimation problem is reduced to one. It is interesting to note that if Pljml
is modelled directly, no information from subsamples other than those containing participants in m and l is
needed for the identi¯cation of (4) and we are basically back in the binary treatment framework. Since the
choice probabilities in (4) will not be known a-priori, they have to be replaced by an estimate, e.g. a probit
model. If all values of m and l are of interest, the whole sample is needed for identi¯cation. In that case either
the binary conditional probabilities can be estimated or a structural approach can be used where a complete
10See Appendix A in Lechner (2001) for a proof.
12choice problem is formulated in one model and estimated on the full sample, e.g. with a multinomial probit
model.
4.2. A Matching Estimator for the Evaluation Problem at Hand
Once the score is available, an estimator is needed that exploits CIA but avoids almost any other assumption
(Lechner (2002b)). One popular choice in this context is the matching estimator.11 The basic idea underlying the
matching approach on balancing scores is to replace the second term on the right hand side of equation (1), that
is E(Y l j S = m), by a selected group of participants in l that has the same distribution for the balancing score
as the group of participants in m. Given the balancing property, the distribution of X will also be balanced in
the two samples. Besides being an intuitively appealing approach and therefore easy to communicate to policy
makers, the matching approach avoids functional form assumptions and allows the e®ects to be di®erent in
speci¯c sub-populations (individual heterogeneity). Furthermore it allows to take account of the fact that the
evaluated programme sectors are not homogeneous (programme heterogeneity, Lechner (2002b)).
When discussing the suitable approach to be used in this application, we have to bear several things in mind.
First, the descriptive statistics have shown that the participants in both regions and in the di®erent measures
are very heterogeneous. Therefore the possible in°uence of regional, individual and sectoral heterogeneity has to
be considered. Second, as has been described in the previous section, the decision process on which programme
to choose is a binary one, making a multinomial approach unappropriate. Furthermore, the policy-relevant
question to answer is, if - in order to enhance their employment prospects - unemployed in February 2000
should be placed in a job creation scheme or not. In the latter case individuals would have to seek a job without
the additional bene¯t of the programme. Finally, the group of non-participants is between twenty and fourty
times larger than the group of participants in any sub-part of the programme.
E®ects in Sub-Populations Therefore we decided to estimate the e®ects of the di®erent programmes in
the di®erent sub-populations relative to non-participation only. Since we are just interested in the pair-wise
comparison of the various kinds of treatments, assumption (2) can be relaxed, requiring conditional independence
to hold only for the sub-population receiving either treatment m or treatment l (see Lechner (2001) and Sianesi
11Recent applications of matching estimation can be found in Ger¯n and Lechner (2002), Sianesi (2004) or Brodaty, Crepon, and
Fougere (2001) for Switzerland, Sweden and France. More methodological aspects are discussed e.g. in Heckman, Ichimura, and
Todd (1998), Smith and Todd (2004) and Blundell and Costa Dias (2000).
13(2004)), where treatment l is our non-participation state and m 2 f1;:::;5g12 :
µml
0 = E(Y m ¡ Y l j S = m) = E(Y m j S = m) ¡ E(Y l j S = m) (5)
for m = 1;:::;5:
Estimating the e®ects separately for men and women in East and West Germany for the di®erent sectors m
accounts for regional, gender-speci¯c and sectoral heterogeneity. To allow additionally for individual hetero-
geneity we also estimate the e®ects for various strata of the population. This strati¯cation is orientated by the
target groups of JCS.
Since young unemployed without profession are one target group, one obvious criterion to look at is the age of
participants. Besides that, JCS should also stabilise `older' unemployed with bad labour market prospects, so
we examine the e®ects in three di®erent age classes (<25, 25-50, >50 years):
µml
0a = E(Y m ¡ Y l j S = m) = E(Y m j S = m) ¡ E(Y l j S = m) (6)
for m = 1;:::;5 and a = Age<25;Age25¡50;Age>50:
Another particular target group are long-term unemployed. Therefore our second criterion is the duration of
previous unemployment (again in three classes: <13, 13-52, >52 weeks):
µml
0u = E(Y m ¡ Y l j S = m) = E(Y m j S = m) ¡ E(Y l j S = m) (7)
for m = 1;:::;5 and u = UN<13;UN13¡52;UN>52:
Matching Algorithm Several di®erent matching estimators have been discussed (see e.g. Heckman, Ichimura,
Smith, and Todd (1998) or Smith and Todd (2004)) and the exact protocol of the one used in that application
can be found in Table A.4. The choice of the matching method involves a trade-o® between matching quality and
variance. First, one has to decide on how many non-treated individuals to match to a single treated individual.
Nearest-neighbour (NN) matching only uses the participant and its closest neighbour. Therefore it minimises
the bias but might also involve an e±ciency loss, since a large number of close neigbours are disregarded.
Kernel-based matching on the other hand uses more non-participants for each participant thereby reducing the
variance but possibly increasing the bias. Finally, using the same non-treated individual more than once (NN
matching with replacement) can possibly improve the matching quality, but increases the variance.13 Since we
12The ¯ve sectors of the programme are: `Agriculture', `Construction & Industry', `O±ce & Services', `Community Services' and
`Other'.
13Following Lechner (2001), the variance of the treatment e®ect at time t is calculated by assuming independent observations,
¯xed weights, homoscedasticity of the outcome variable within the treatment and within the control group and that the outcome
14have a large sample of participants and an even larger sample of non-participants, we use NN matching without
replacement for our study.14
Common Support A further requirement besides independence is the common support condition. It requires
that all individuals in that subspace actually can participate in all states:
0 < P(S = mjX = x) < 1;8m = 0;::::;M;8x 2 Â: (8)
If there are regions where the support of X does not overlap for the di®erent groups, matching is only justi¯ed
when performed over the common support region and the estimated treatment e®ect must then be rede¯ned as
the treatment impact for programme participants whose probabilities lie within the overlapping support region
(Smith and Todd (2004)).
Match Quality Since we do not condition on all covariates but on the propensity score, it has to be checked if
the matching procedure is able to balance the distribution of the relevant variables in the control and treatment
groups. One suitable indicator to assess the distance in the marginal distributions of these characteristics is
the standardised bias suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985). For each covariate X it is de¯ned as the
di®erence of the sample means in the treated and matched control subsamples as a percentage of the square
root of the average of the sample variances in both groups (Sianesi (2004)).15
When to compare An important decision which has to be made in the empirical analysis is when to measure
the e®ects. The major goal is to ensure that participants and non-participants are compared in the same
economic environment and the same individual lifecycle position. One possible problem which has to be taken
into account is the occurrence of locking-in e®ects. The literature is dominated by two approaches, either
comparing the individuals from the begin of the programme or after the end of the programme. The latter
alternative implies that the outcome of participants who ¯nish the programme in October 2000 and re-enter
the labour market in November 2000, is compared with matched non-participants in November 2000. This
approach is problematic if the exits are spread over a longer time period because possibly very di®erent economic
does not depend on the propensity score: V ar(^ µml
N ) = (Nm)¡1 ¢ V ar(Y m j S = m) + [(§i2l(wm
i )2)=((Nm)2)] ¢ V ar(Y l j S = l);
where Nm is the number of matched treated in programme m and wi is the number of times control i has been used, where
§i2l(wm
i ) = 1. The left term can be re-written as:(Nm)¡1 ¢ [(§i2l(wm
i )2)=(Nm)] ¢ V ar(Y l j S = l): If no unit is matched more
than once, the formula conincides with the 'usual' variance formula.
14The sensitivity of the results has been tested with respect to matching with replacement, but no signi¯cant di®erences could
be found.
15That is 100 ¢ (X1 ¡ X0M)=f
p
(V1(X) + V0M(X))=2g, where X1 (V1) is the mean (variance) in the treated group and XOM
((V0M) is the mean in the matched control group.
15situations are compared. A further problem which arises with this approach is that it entails an endogeneity
problem (Ger¯n and Lechner (2002)). A second approach which is predominant in the recent literature (see e.g.
Sianesi (2004) or Ger¯n and Lechner (2002)) and which is also used here, measures the e®ects from the begin of
the programme. Since one entry condition for the participants is that they had to be unemployed (at least) in
January 2000, the control group has been chosen in the way that they ful¯ll this condition, too.16 So basically,
the policy-relevant question is if the placement o±cer should place an unemployed individual in February 2000
in a JCS or not. Therefore comparing both groups from the begin of the programme seems to be a reasonable
approach.
Locking-in E®ect What should be kept in mind is the possible occurrence of locking-in e®ects for the group
of participants. Since they are involved in the programme, they do not have the same time to search for a
new job as non-participants. Following van Ours (2002), the net e®ect of a programme consists of two opposite
e®ects. First, the increased employment probability through the programme and second, the reduced search
intensity. Since both e®ects cannot be disentangled, we only observe the net e®ect and have to take this into
account when interpreting the results. As to the fall in the search intensity we should expect an initial negative
e®ect from any kind of participation in a programme. However, since we observe the outcome of the individuals
until two years after the begin of the programme a successful programme should overcompensate for this initial
fall.
5. Empirical Analysis
5.1. Implementation
Plausibility of CIA in our Context Before starting with the estimation of the propensity scores, we have
to consider brie°y the plausibility of the CIA in our context. As already noted for the CIA to be ful¯lled we
need to condition on all variables that jointly in°uence the participation decision and the outcome variable.
The used dataset contains four di®erent categories of variables. First, socio-demographic variables like age,
gender, marital status, number of children, etc. Second, information about the quali¯cational background, e.g.
education, occupational group, professional rank and work experience. Third, the dataset also includes, and that
is most important since previous studies have emphasised the importance of the labour market history, career
16In fact, the average duration of unemployment in January 2000 is 72.31 (65.93) weeks for the non-participants and between
53.13 (53.10) and 66.79 (64.11) weeks for the participants in the di®erent sectors in West (East) Germany.
16details. In this category, we have information about the duration of the last employment and unemployment
which leaves us on average with a labour market history of two years before the programme started. Furthermore,
this category also contains information about placement restraints and the number of placement propositions.
Finally, to take account of the regional labour market situation, the fourth category includes the size of the
labour o±ce district and the underemployment rate of that region in the fourth quarter of 1999. Given this
informative dataset, we argue henceforth that the CIA holds.
Propensity Scores We estimated binary probits for every treatment group m 2 f1;:::;5g against the group
of non-participants. To account for regional heterogeneity and to allow for gender-speci¯c interaction e®ects,
the probits are estimated separately for men and women in East and West Germany, leaving us with 18 probit
estimations.17 The choice of the variables that are selected in the estimation are based on score tests. The
results can be found in tables A.5, A.6, A.7 and A.8 in the appendix.
It is worth noting that the parameters of the choice estimations not only diverge with respect to regional
di®erences but also with respect to gender-speci¯c and programme sector-speci¯c aspects. For example, married
men (¡0:1189) and women (¡0:2047) in West Germany have a lower probability to participate in a programme
in the sector `Community Services' than men (0:2496) and women (0:0696) in East Germany. A good example
for the programme-speci¯c di®erences is the in°uence of age for the participation decision. Whereas age has
a negative impact on the probability for men in West Germany to join the sector `Construction & Industry'
(¡0:0588), it has a positive impact for joining `O±ce & Services' (0:1187). There is a strong tendency for
men with health restrictions to take up a programme in the `O±ce & Services' sector. People with higher
quali¯cations (college or university degree, polytechnic or technical school) tend to go in the sectors `O±ce
& Services' or `Community Services'. It is quite interesting to note that in comparison to people without
completed professional training, all other individuals have a negative probability to go in the `Agriculture'
sector. The in°uence of the former profession is straightforward in most of the sub-groups. Individuals who
have been in manufacturing have a higher probability of ending up in the sectors `Agriculture' or `Construction
& Industry'. In contrast to this, individuals with service professions tend to go either in the sector `O±ce
& Services' or `Community Services'. An exception can be found in East Germany where men coming from
17Since the number of participating women in West Germany in the sectors `Agriculture' and `Construction & Industry' has been
too small, they have been excluded from the analysis. We also estimated the propensity scores for the two regions with dummy
variables for the sex. However, using the results of these 10 probits ignores possible gender-speci¯c interaction e®ects and the fact
that the coe±cients in the estimation di®er in their signi¯cance and magnitude between men and women. This leads to a worse
matching quality in the sense that the balancing of covariates after matching is reduced, i.e. the standardised bias is higher.
17Table 3: Loss of observations due to the common support requirement (in %)¤
West Germany East Germany
Men Women Men Women
Part. Non-Part. Part. Non-Part. Part. Non-Part. Part. Non-Part.
Agriculture 0.74 7.32 - - 0.11 0.61 0.11 2.46
Construction & Industry 0.25 17.22 - - 0.00 9.61 0.00 10.31
O±ce & Services 1.47 20.14 0.94 13.31 0.50 29.89 0.15 3.88
Social Services 0.57 4.83 0.37 4.41 0.24 5.61 0.11 0.65
Other 0.12 2.80 0.00 6.74 0.10 0.67 0.14 2.66
¤ The total number of participants lost is 24.
{ Groups with less than 50 observations are omitted.
technical professions are more likely to participate in `O±ce & Services' compared to men coming from service
professions. Other characteristics like the number of placement propositions show the same trend for all groups
and sectors. In general the people with a higher number of placement propositions have a higher probability
to join JCS. The list of examples is long, but for the sake of brevity we stop commenting here. The interested
reader is referred to the tables in the appendix.
Common Support The estimated propensity scores are used for our matching procedure. To ensure the
common support requirement we had to delete some observations across the di®erent subsamples. Since we
estimated pairwise e®ects between the ¯ve di®erent treatments vs. non-participation, we used the criterion that
all estimated probabilities in the particular subgroups are smaller than the smallest maximum and larger than
the largest minimum.18 The number of observations lost due to this requirement can be found in table 3. It can
be seen that the number of participants lost in the speci¯c subgroups is fairly small. The maximum is 1:47% for
men in West Germany who are in the `O±ce & Services' sector, whereas in all other subgroups the loss is below
1%. For the non-participants, however, the losses lie between 0:61% and 29:89%. But since we had a much
larger group of non-participants and furthermore we are interested in the ATET only, this loss is negligible.
Matching Quality Since we do not condition on all covariates but on the propensity score, we check the
ability of the matching procedure to balance the relevant covariates by comparing the absolute bias between
the respective participating and non-participating groups before and after the matching took place. The results
can be found in table 4. The bias before matching lies between 10% and 20% and a signi¯cant reduction can be
achieved for all subgroups so that the bias after matching is below 4% for ten out of eighteen subgroups. For
18Several other common support conditions have been suggested, e.g. Smith and Todd (2004) propose to use a `trimming level' q.
That is, not only observations with zero density but also those where the densities are positive but very low (below q) are excluded
from the analysis.
18Table 4: Matching quality (Standardised bias)¤
abs. bias in
%
Agriculture Construction
& Industry
O±ce &
Services
Social
Services
Other
Men West
before 15.00 15.32 20.30 15.93 12.80
after 4.23 3.45 6.20 5.33 2.85
Women West
before { { 17.68 16.02 14.80
after { { 5.86 3.19 5.54
Men East
before 14.50 13.68 20.31 13.16 11.64
after 2.99 3.15 5.77 4.75 2.36
Women East
before 13.93 16.99 17.48 11.68 10.27
after 2.65 6.56 2.44 1.87 2.23
¤ The standardised bias is de¯ned as: 100 ¢ (X1 ¡ X0M)=f
p
(V1(X) + V0M(X))=2g. The `total' bias
has been estimated as an unweighted average of all covariates.
the rest of the subgroups the bias after matching is between 4:23% and 6:20% (for men in West Germany in the
sector `O±ce & Services'). Given the fact that the bias for the latter group has been 20:3% this is acceptable.
It should be clear that matching balances the distribution of observed characteristics only. In fact, CIA assumes
that a selection only occurs on these variables. To test the sensitivity of our results with respect to unobserved
in°uences, we will use an approach suggested by Rosenbaum (2002) after the presentation of the results in the
next section.
5.2. Results
Outcome Variable One major element of programme evaluation is the choice of a suitable outcome variable.
Since one goal of JCS in Germany is the re-integration of unemployed in the ¯rst labour market, one obvious
choice would be the employment status of the individuals.19 However, our dataset does not contain the employ-
ment status but it allows us to monitor if the individual is registered as a job-seeker or not. This information
is divided into three categories. Individuals may be either registered unemployed (category 1), registered as
job-seeker but not unemployed (category 2) or not registered as job-seeker (category 3). Since these formal
de¯nitions are not very enlightening, they are best explained with some examples. The most straightforward
category and the only one which does not need an additional explanation is the ¯rst one, i.e. the one which
contains all unemployed people. The second category contains all people who are registered as job-seekers
but not as unemployed. Good examples for this category are individuals in temporary employment, regular
employed who are looking for an alternative job and also individuals participating in an active labour market
programme. Finally, the last category (not registered as job seeker) includes individuals in regular employment.
19Other goals besides that, e.g. social stabilisation, cannot be evaluated here.
19Unfortunately, this category might also contain individuals on maternity leave, who have just retired or left the
labour force for other reasons. Table 5 summarises the available information.
Table 5: Lower and upper bounds for the outcome variable
Status De¯nition Rating
Lower Bound Upper Bound
Registered unemployed
(category 1)
Individuals who are registered as unemployed at the
labour o±ce
Failure Failure
Registered as job-see-
king, but not unemplo-
yed (category 2)
Individuals who are registered as job-seeking at the
labour o±ce, but not as unemployed. These are for
example employees in regular employment, who are
threatened by unemployment or seeking another oc-
cupation, participants in active labour market policy
programmes.
Success
Not registered as job-
seeker (category 3)
Persons who are not registered as job-seeking at the
labour o±ce, for example individuals in regular em-
ployment, maternity leave or retirement.
Success
Especially the second category is hard to assess, as an individual in that category might on the one hand be
regularly employed or on the other hand participate in another labour market programme. Assessing people
in that category as a failure might therefore lead to an underestimation of the treatment e®ect, whereas an
assessment of them as a success would lead to an overestimation. To overcome this problem we estimate
lower and upper bounds for the true treatment e®ect (success probability on the labour market). People in
the ¯rst category are measured as a failure in both scenarios. Measuring people in the third category as a
success of the programme in terms of re-employment is problematic since people in that category might also
have left the labour force. If people are discouraged for further job-seeking after participation and leave the
labour force, this outcome does not equal integration into regular employment. However, following budgetary
considerations individuals in the third category are a success, since they do not get bene¯ts from the FEA
anymore and therefore lessen the ¯nancial burden of the FEA. Following these considerations, we de¯ne people
in this category as a success in the lower as well as in the upper bound scenario. Finally, people in the second
category are measured as a success in the upper bound and as a failure in the lower bound scenario. The true
success probability of leaving unemployment for any destination will lie within these boundaries. Obviously,
the time during the programme is rated as a failure for the participants.
Outcomes over Time At ¯rst we will take a look at the success probabilities of participating individuals
over time. We estimated the e®ects for the participants from March 2000 until March 2002. Participation in
JCS reduces the search intensity during the programme period; therefore one has to consider the monthly exit
20rates of participants for interpretation, which are given in table A.3. As can be seen, the exit-rate for men in
West Germany lies around 5% per month during the ¯rst eleven months of the programme (for women slightly
lower). The exit-rate reaches its peak after one year in February 2001 with 34.65% (women: 39.41%) which is
the regular duration for JCS. By that time 91.6% (86.4%) of all men (women) have left the programme. At the
same time 93.5% (93.1%) of all men (women) have left the programmes in East Germany, too. An interesting
di®erence is that the peak of exits here is much more pronounced after twelve months (Men: 69.42%, women:
72.51%). That means that we observe the outcome for the majority of individuals for at least one year after
the programme ends, even though for some individuals the observed time horizon is up to 23 months. In that
sense we can only make statements regarding the short-term e®ects of the programmes. Given these exit rates,
a locking-in e®ect during the ¯rst months after programme start has to be expected.
Figures B.1, B.2, B.3 and B.4 show the success probabilities, i.e. the di®erences in the outcomes between
participants and matched non-participants, for West and East Germany over time. The success probabilities
are di®erentiated by gender and the ¯ve sectors. Since the number of female participants in West Germany
in the sectors `Agriculture' and `Construction & Industry' has been too small (43 and 41), these sectors have
been excluded from the analysis. The ¯gures show the lower and upper bounds of the true treatment e®ect.
An e®ect below the zero line means that the participants have on average a lower success probability than the
matched non-participants.
The expected locking-in e®ects are clearly visible during the ¯rst months after programme start. Especially in
East Germany the success probabilities are strongly decreasing in the ¯rst months, reaching their lowest value
in the autumn of 2000. After that the e®ects are upward sloping. In West Germany a similar pattern can be
found, even though the decrease in the beginning is not so pronounced due to the di®erent exit behaviour.
As noted above we have estimated a lower and an upper bound for the e®ects. In most cases the lower bound
of the e®ects lies in the ¯rst months above the upper bound which might be somewhat confusing. However,
this is easily understandable if one looks at the construction of these bounds. The analysed participation (¯rst
treatment) is taken as a failure in both scenarios. Due to the fact that individuals from the control group may
enter the category 2 status (registered job-seekers but not unemployed) and are then judged as a success in the
upper bound scenario, the upper bound slips under the lower bound because nearly all participants are still in
the programmes at that time. Since we cannot separate the locking-in e®ect from the treatment e®ect, we will
start our interpretation when the majority of participants has left their programmes, that is after March 2001.
21Another consequence of the de¯nition of the upper bound in connection with using the ¯rst treatment as a
failure is an abrupt rise in the success probabilities after most programmes have ended. Almost all ¯gures show
this instance in February/March 2001. For some groups, e.g. men in `Agriculture' or `Construction & Industry'
in West Germany, this rise begins earlier due to shorter treatment durations.
While the mean upper bounds surge in March 2001 (after the majority of individuals have left the programmes),
the lower bounds of the success probabilities are increasing only slowly. This results in a clear spread between the
lower and the upper bounds of the success probabilities. The spread indicates a high proportion of participants,
who could leave open unemployment after treatment, but are still registered job-seekers.
Since the purpose of JCS is to stabilise and qualify unemployed for the re-integration into regular employment,
we expect an increasing success probability for participants after the programmes end. Due to the strong locking-
in e®ect, the starting position for participants is on average lower than for the non-participants. However, since
we observe the outcomes until two years after start of the programmes and one year after the majority of the
individuals has left the programmes, a successful programme should overcompensate for this initial fall.
Sectoral Heterogeneity Table 6 summarises the e®ects for the treatment groups in the ¯ve sectors in March
2002 which is the end of our observation period. To give an example for the interpretation let us look at the
e®ect for East German women in `Agriculture'. The lower bound of the e®ect is -13.59%, the upper bound is
-6.38%. That means that participants have a success probability which is between 6.38% and 13.59% lower as
the success probability of non-participants. The di®erences between the sectors are enormous, e.g. the lower
bounds of the e®ects for men in East Germany lie between -12.29% (`Construction & Industry') and -25.32%
(`Agriculture').
What is most striking is the fact that the success probabilities are signi¯cant negative for nearly all of the groups
and sectors. The only exception are women in East Germany who participate in `Community Services'. The
upper bound e®ect for this group is 3.86%. However, the lower bound for this group amounts to -11.53%. Since
the true treatment e®ect lies somewhere between these boundaries, we cannot identify a persuasive positive
e®ect.
Clearly programmes in some sectors are better than others, but overall none of the programmes helps its
participants to have a higher success probability than non-participants two years after start. The sectors which
are most harmful for participating individuals in West Germany are `Construction & Industry' for men (-19.39%
/ -11.99%) and `O±ce & Services' for women (-18.10% / not signi¯cant). In East Germany `Agriculture' is the
22Table 6: Average e®ects (in %) for participants 24 months (Mar/02) after programme start { Sensitivity Analysis
with Rosenbaum Bounds
Upper Bound Scenario Lower Bound Scenario
ATET QMH Critical ATET QMH Critical
Group Mar/02 for e° = 1 value of e° Mar/02 for e° = 1 value of e°
West-Germany
Men
Agriculture -1.68 0.45 { -11.94 16.87 1.01-1.05
Constr.& Industry -11.99 12.29 1.25-1.30 -19.39 31.28 1.01-1.05
O±ce & Services -3.73 0.14 { -16.42 6.09 1.01-1.05
Comm. Services -6.34 2.47 { -15.85 16.34 1.10-1.15
Other -9.43 16.23 1.20-1.25 -17.78 54.07 1.10-1.15
Women(a)
O±ce & Services -4.29 1.08 { -18.10 15.61 1.01-1.05
Comm. Services -4.13 2.02 { -15.95 27.70 1.01-1.05
Other -4.44 1.28 { -14.33 12.88 1.10-1.15
East-Germany
Men
Agriculture -12.54 27.88 1.35-1.40 -25.32 119.99 1.10-1.15
Constr.& Industry -2.95 0.40 { -12.29 12.25 1.35-1.40
O±ce & Services -2.49 0.25 { -17.91 13.94 1.30-1.35
Comm. Services -3.39 0.59 { -21.79 36.67 1.01-1.05
Other -12.96 32.85 1.50-1.55 -23.26 119.37 1.20-1.25
Women
Agriculture -6.30 7.60 1.01-1.05 -13.59 40.91 1.25-1.30
Constr.& Industry -2.13 0.27 { -15.96 12.69 1.05-1.10
O±ce & Services 2.16 0.79 { -14.51 29.84 1.30-1.35
Comm. Services 3.86 4.95 1.75-1.80 -11.53 55.82 1.35-1.40
Other -1.29 0.55 { -14.76 73.12 1.30-1.35
Bold letters indicate signi¯cance at the 1% level, Italic letters refer to the 5% level.
ATET Mar/02: Average e®ect (in %) for participants 24 months after programme start.
QMH: Value of the Mantel-Haensel test-statistic for ATE Mar/02.
{ indicates that the e®ect has not been signi¯cant on the 5%-level
(a) E®ects for groups with less than 50 observations are omitted.
worst sector for men (-25.32% / -12.84%) and `Construction & Industry' is the worst for women (-15.96% / not
signi¯cant). As all e®ects (apart from the upper bound of women in East Germany in `Community Services') lie
below that of the matched non-participants, JCS seem to have no positive impact on the success probabilities
for participants up to 24 months after treatment.
Sensitivity Analysis with Rosenbaum Bounds Our estimation is based on the CIA which basically states
that the distribution of covariates X is balanced between the treatment and the control group. If however, both
groups di®er on unobserved variables which a®ect simultaneously the assignment to treatment and the outcome
variable a 'hidden bias' might arise.20 It should be clear, that matching estimators are not robust against this
'hidden bias'. Since it is not possible to estimate the magnitude of selection bias with non-experimental data,
20This bias is also said to arise on unobservable factors or unobserved heterogeneity.
23we address this problem with the bounding approach proposed by Rosenbaum (2002). The basic question to be
answered is if inference about programme e®ects may be altered by unobserved factors. In other words, we want
to determine how strongly an unmeasured variable must in°uence the selection process in order to undermine
the implications of matching analysis. Two recent applications of this approach can be found in Aakvik (2001)
and DiPrete and Gangl (2004). We will outline the basic idea of this approach in the following, an extensive
discussion can be found in Rosenbaum (2002).
To do so let us rewrite the participation probability for individual i with observed characteristics xi in a
programme as
¼i = Pr(Di = 1 j xi) = F(¯xi + °ui); (9)
where ui is the unobserved variable and ° is the e®ect of ui on the participation decision. Clearly, if the study
is free of hidden bias, ° will be zero and the participation probability will solely be determined by xi. However,
if there is hidden bias, two individuals with the same observed covariates x have di®ering chances of receiving
treatment. Let us assume we have a matched pair of individuals i and j and further assume that F is the
logistics distribution. The odds that the individuals receive treatment are then given by ¼i
(1¡¼i) and
¼j
(1¡¼j), and
the odds ratio is given by:
¼i
1¡¼i
¼j
1¡¼j
=
¼i(1 ¡ ¼j)
¼j(1 ¡ ¼i)
=
exp(¯xj + °uj)
exp(¯xi + °ui)
= exp[°(ui ¡ uj)]: (10)
If both units have the same observed covariates - as implied by the matching procedure - the x-vector cancels.
But still, the individuals di®er in their odds of receiving treatment by a factor that involves the parameter ° and
the di®erence in their unobserved covariates u. It is now the task of sensitivity analysis to evaluate how inference
about the programme e®ect is altered by changing the values of ° and (ui ¡ uj). We follow Aakvik (2001) and
assume for the sake of simplicity that the unobserved covariate is a dummy variable with ui 2 f0;1g. A good
example is the case where motivation plays a role for the participation decision and the outcome variable, and
a person is either motivated (u = 1) or not (u = 0). Rosenbaum (2002) shows that (10) implies the following
bounds on the ratio of the odds that either of the two matched individuals will receive treatment:
1
e° ·
¼i(1 ¡ ¼j)
¼j(1 ¡ ¼i)
· e°: (11)
The two matched individuals have the same probability of participating only if e° = 1. If e° = 2, then
individuals who appear to be similar (in terms of x), could di®er in their odds of receiving the treatment by as
much as factor of 2. In this sense, e° is a measure of the degree of departure from a study that is free of hidden
24bias (Rosenbaum, 2002). Aakvik (2001) suggests to use the Mantel and Haenszel (1959) test statistic. To do so,
some additional notation is needed. We observe the outcome y some time after treatment for both participants
and non-participants. If y is una®ected by di®erent treatment assignments d, the treatment is said to have
no e®ect. If y is di®erent for di®erent assignments, then the treatment has some positive (or negative) e®ect.
To be signi¯cant, the treatment e®ect has to cross some test statistic. The Mantel-Haenszel nonparametric
test compares the successful number of persons in the treatment group against the same expected number
given the training e®ect is zero. Aakvik (2001) notes that the MH-test can be used to test for no treatment
e®ect both within di®erent strata of the sample and as a weighted average between strata. Under the null-
hypothesis the distribution of y is hypergeometric. We notate n1s and n0s as the numbers of treated and
non-treated individuals in stratum s, where ns = n0s + n1s. y1s is the number of successful participants, y0s
is the number of successful non-participants, and ys is the number of total successes in stratum s. The test-
statistic QMH = (y1s ¡ E(y1s)=V ar(s1y)) follows the chi-square distribution with one degree of freedom and is
given by:
QMH =
U2
V ar(U)
=
[
PS
s=1(y1s ¡
n1sys
ns )]2
PS
s=1
n1sn0sys(ns¡ys)
n2
s(ns¡1)
: (12)
To use a test-statistic like t(d;y) we ¯rst have to make the treatment and the control group as equal as possible
since the test is based on random sampling. Since this is done by our matching procedure, we can proceed to
discuss the possible in°uences of e° > 1. For ¯xed e° > 1 and u 2 f0;1g Rosenbaum (2002) shows that the
test-statistics QMH can be bounded by two known distributions. As noted already, if e° = 1 the bounds are
equal to the 'base' scenario of no hidden bias. With increasing e° the bounds move apart re°ecting uncertainty
about the test-statistics in the presence of unobserved selection bias. Two scenarios can be thought of. Let
Q
+
MH be the test-statistics given that we have overestimated the treatment e®ect and Q
¡
MH the case where we
have underestimated the treatment e®ect.
The two bounds are then given by:
Q
+
MH =
[
PS
s=1(y1s ¡ e E+
s )]2
PS
s=1 V ar( e E
+
s )
and Q
¡
MH =
[
PS
s=1(y1s ¡ e E¡
s )]2
PS
s=1 V ar( e E
¡
s )
; (13)
where f Es and V ar(f Es) are the large sample approximations to the expectation and variance of the number of
successful participants when u is binary and for given °.21
21The large sample approximation of f E+
s is the unique root of the following quadratic equation: e E2
s(e° ¡ 1) ¡ e Es[(e° ¡ 1) +
(n1s + ys) + ns] + e°ysn1s, with the addition of max(0;ys + n1s ¡ ns · f Es · min(ys;n1s) to decide which root to use. e E¡
s is
determined by replacing e° by 1
e° . The large sample approximation of the variance is given by
25Results of the Sensitivity Analysis The Rosenbaum bounds allow us now to test the sensitivity of our
results in table 6 for varying degrees of unobserved di®erences in both scenarios of the underlying outcome
variable. First of all, the table shows the results of the Mantel and Haenszel (1959) test-statistic for the
situation free of hidden bias. As shown above, e° is a measure of the degree of departure from a study that
is free from 'hidden bias'. The test statistic QMH for e° = 1 re°ects the situation with no 'hidden bias'. A
Â2-value below 3:84 indicates that the treatment e®ect is not signi¯cant. Clearly, a sensitivity analysis for
insigni¯cant e®ects is not meaningful and hence will be omitted. For the e®ects which are signi¯cant in the ¯rst
place we gradually increase the level of e° until the inference about the treatment e®ect is changed. In other
words, we are assessing the strength unmeasured in°uences would require in order that the inference about the
treatment e®ect is changed.
The interpretation is straightforward: If we look at the e®ect for men in the 'Construction & Industry' sector in
West-Germany we see that the e®ect in the upper bound scenario is ¡11:94% and signi¯cant. The critical value
of e° is between 1:25¡1:30. A critical value of 1:30 would suggest that individuals that have the same x-vector
di®er in their odds of participating in treatment by a factor of 1.30, or 30%. It is important to note that these
are worst-case scenarios. A critical value of e° = 1:30 does not mean that there is unobserved heterogeneity
present and that there is no e®ect of treatment on the outcome variable. This result only means that the
con¯dence interval for the e®ect would include zero if an unobserved variable caused the odds ratio of treatment
assignment to di®er between treatment and control groups by 1:30 and if this variable's e®ect on the outcome is
so strong that it almost perfectly determines the outcome in each pair of matched cases in the data. Hence, even
if there is unobserved heterogeneity to a degree of e° = 1:25 in the group of West-German men in 'Construction
& Industry', inference about the treatment e®ect would not be changed. The results in this table make clear
that for most groups a relatively high level of 'hidden bias' could be in the data without changing the inference
about the treatment e®ects. However, some exceptions can be found and some restrictions apply. For some
of the sub-populations, especially for men and women in West-Germany under the lower bound scenario, the
critical value of e° is somewhere below 1:05. That implies that even small magnitudes of 'hidden bias' would
alter the inference and consequently interpretation for these sub-populations hinges on this restriction.
Outcomes for the Sub-Populations What is left to examine is the individual heterogeneity. Even though
the programmes do not work for the participants as a whole, it might be the case that they work for some
V ar(e Es) = ( 1
e Es
+ 1
ys¡e Es
+ 1
n1s¡e Es
+ 1
ns¡ys¡n1s¡e Es
)¡1.
26Table 7: Average e®ects (in %) for participants 24 months (Mar/02) after programme start
Agriculture Construction &
Industry
O±ce & Services Community
Services
Other
Lower-
bound
Upper-
bound
No. Lower-
bound
Upper-
bound
No. Lower-
bound
Upper-
bound
No. Lower-
bound
Upper-
bound
No. Lower-
bound
Upper-
bound
No.
Men in West Germany
Age (in years)
<26 -11.34 -5.15 98 -6.98 -3.10 130 { { { -19.30 -15.79 114 -15.65 -10.87 230
26-50 -10.37 0.29 349 -10.50 -6.39 219 -9.90 0.00 103 -10.15 0.00 198 -16.45 -7.79 463
>50 -8.70 3.26 93 { { { { { { { { { -23.29 -6.16 146
Unemployment duration (in weeks)
<13 -16.80 -5.60 126 -6.35 -1.59 126 { { { -24.11 -16.07 112 -16.13 -6.45 248
13-52 -17.88 -7.82 179 -15.67 -10.45 135 { { { -6.72 0.75 134 -18.25 -11.93 285
>52 -12.50 -3.02 235 -4.55 1.52 132 -5.88 11.76 69 -9.90 4.95 103 -16.72 -7.87 306
Women in West Germany
Age (in years)
<26 { { { { { { { { { -21.05 -14.04 114 -12.20 -7.32 82
26-50 { { { { { { -17.88 -1.32 152 -17.30 -3.81 342 -12.57 0.00 175
>50 { { { { { { { { { -3.85 7.69 79 { { {
Unemployment duration (in weeks)
<13 { { { { { { -22.45 -8.16 50 -18.75 -8.59 129 -18.29 -6.10 82
13-52 { { { { { { -33.33 -14.29 84 -19.23 -7.21 208 -29.13 -16.50 103
>52 { { { { { { 5.19 11.69 78 -14.21 -1.02 198 2.78 7.41 108
Men in East Germany
Age (in years)
<26 -20.75 -18.87 53 { { { { { { -17.46 -14.29 63 -20.30 -12.78 133
26-50 -15.53 -9.36 438 -8.17 -0.39 257 -9.20 8.05 87 -23.15 -6.02 217 -16.48 -7.96 542
>50 -42.33 -20.37 379 -39.66 -18.10 116 -36.04 -21.62 111 -38.81 -7.46 134 -40.16 -25.27 376
Unemployment duration (in weeks)
<13 -27.22 -13.29 158 -1.22 10.98 82 { { { -25.77 5.15 98 -27.19 -18.89 217
13-52 -22.29 -4.52 333 -9.20 6.32 174 -26.32 -8.42 95 -15.82 3.57 196 -20.53 -9.27 455
>52 -22.96 -14.51 379 -25.83 -19.21 151 -17.65 -1.47 69 -7.50 0.00 120 -22.69 -12.14 379
Women in East Germany
Age (in years)
<26 { { { { { { { { { -11.11 -8.33 73 -2.70 8.11 74
26-50 -15.01 -11.37 633 -10.32 5.56 126 -8.45 5.56 416 -7.87 7.78 1170 -11.04 0.52 970
>50 -19.69 -3.86 259 -30.36 -21.43 56 -31.11 -10.22 225 -25.87 -9.79 572 -23.73 -3.69 435
Unemployment duration (in weeks)
<13 -17.07 -4.88 83 { { { -24.42 -9.30 86 -22.16 0.00 186 -23.62 -8.04 199
13-52 -1.67 5.00 300 -27.14 -7.14 70 -21.53 -1.09 276 -13.24 4.72 764 -13.20 2.29 569
>52 { { { -21.59 -6.82 88 -10.42 3.13 288 -9.94 -0.46 865 -11.13 -0.56 711
Bold letters indicate signi¯cance at the 1% level, Italic letters refer to the 5% level.
{ E®ects for groups with less than 50 observations are omitted.
sub-populations. One could assume e.g. that they are especially e®ective for the explicit target groups of JCS.
Table 7 shows the e®ects on the success probabilities for the six sub-populations under consideration 24 months
after programmes start. Besides the lower and upper bounds of the e®ects, the number of participants in the
respective strata is given. Sub-groups with less than 50 observations were excluded from the analysis.
The only signi¯cant positive e®ect can be found for women between 26 and 50 years who participate in the
sector `Community & Services' in East Germany; their e®ect lies between -7.87% and 7.78%. For the rest of
27the groups the e®ects are at best insigni¯cant. However, for the majority of the groups a participation in JCS
has strongly negative impacts two years after programme start. Surprisingly, even the target groups (young
and long-term unemployed) have no signi¯cant positive e®ects. On the contrary, long-term unemployed (over
52 weeks) men in East Germany have success probabilities between -25.83% (lower bound for `Construction &
Industry') and -12.14% (upper bound for `Other'). For the long-term unemployed men and women in West
Germany as well as for women in East Germany only few signi¯cant (all negative) results can be found. Due
to the limited number of observations an assessment of the situation of young unemployed can only be given
for a small number of groups. For women in East Germany no signi¯cant e®ects are found, young men in East
Germany have e®ects between -20,75% (lower bound for `Agriculture') and -12.78% (upper bound for `Other').
The e®ect for young men and women participating in `Community Services' is similarly bad.
The worst success probabilities are estimated for older (over 50 years) men in East Germany throughout all
sectors. For older women in East Germany the situation is slightly better, even though the signi¯cant results still
lie between -31.11% (lower bound for `O±ce & Services') and -9.79% (upper bound for `Community Services')
and therefore below those of non-participants.
Considering di®erent unemployment durations before treatment shows no di®erent picture. The success prob-
abilities of the participants are here below those of the non-participants, too. Again, the e®ects are at best
insigni¯cant. The worst e®ects can be found for men in West Germany who have been short-term unemployed
and participate in `Community Services' (-24.11% / -16.07%). Women in the same region with an unemploy-
ment duration between 13 and 52 weeks participating in `O±ce & Services' (-33.33% / -14.29%) are even worse
o®. In East Germany e.g. short-term unemployed men in the sector `Others' (-27.19% / -18.89%) and women
with 13-52 weeks of unemployment participating in `Construction & Industry' (-27.14% / not signi¯cant) have
the most negative results.
5.3. Policy Conclusions
As already mentioned, the main purpose of JCS is the stabilisation and quali¯cation of unemployed individuals
in order to re-integrate them into the ¯rst labour market. Particular target groups are young unemployed
without professional training and long-term unemployed, even though the composition of the participants in
our dataset does not show a clear concentration on these groups. Tables A.1 and A.2 show that the majority of
participants in West Germany throughout all sectors is between 25 and 50 years old. The share of short-term
28unemployed is here higher than could be expected (between 21.26% and 32.26%). In East Germany, the share
of people between 25 and 50 years is even larger, whereas the share of young unemployed only lies between
1.53% and 8.19%. With respect to unemployment duration the majority of participants belongs to the target
group.
To get a clear picture of the treatment e®ects we accounted for several sources of heterogeneity in our estimation.
Besides regional and gender-speci¯c di®erences we also allowed for sectoral and individual heterogeneity. We
also tested the sensitivity of the results with respect to unobserved heterogeneity or 'hidden bias'. Especially
for West-Germany we have found that the results in our lower bound scenario are sensitive to 'hidden bias' and
hence this restriction applies for interpretation. However, given the fact that we have a strong dataset, i.e. a
large number of explanatory variables, we have reason to believe that the problem of unobserved heterogeneity
is less important, allowing us to draw some policy conclusions.
As expected the e®ects showed a wide span in di®erent sub-populations and di®erent sectors of JCS. However,
the most striking ¯nding is that no signi¯cant positive e®ects can be established for any sub-population in
any sector.22 The initial negative e®ect of participation could not be overcompensated during our observation
period until March 2002, even though most of the sub-populations show increasing success probabilities after
the ¯rst months. Since we can observe the outcome for the individuals for two years after the programme starts
and for the majority of people for at least one year after it ends, it is reasonable to assume that the locking-in
e®ect is of minor importance in March 2002.
Thus, the question arises why participants have on average signi¯cantly lower success probabilities on the
labour market than comparable non-participants. One reason might be the often cited `stigma-e®ects'. If the
programme is targeted at people with `disadvantages', there is always a risk that a possible employer takes
participation in such schemes as a negative signal concerning the expected productivity or motivation. If
that is the case, the hoped-for positive e®ects of JCS might vanish. Another reason might be the already
mentioned locking-in e®ect during the ¯rst months of treatment. Even though participants in JCS should
continue searching for a new job, it is questionable whether this is realistic. Due to their occupation in the
programme they will have a reduced search intensity. This is only justi¯able if one thinks that being in the
measure per se will pay o® later on, e.g. through positive e®ects on the employability or increased human
capital through quali¯cation in the programme. It seems that neither of the two goals (employability and
22The only exception is the upper bound for women in `Community Services' in East Germany.
29quali¯cation) can be achieved in a satisfying way which would result in a positive success probability. Therefore
it is debatable whether the design of the programmes is appropriate. One possibility would be to shorten
the treatment durations. To become employable i.e. to give possible employers a positive signal it might be
su±cient to participate in a programme for less than one year, which is the regular duration at the moment.
Since JCS seem to miss the purpose of qualifying participants for re-integration in the labour market, another
proposition is a higher share of qualifying elements during the programme. This might, together with regular
inspections of the progress, enhance the human capital of the participating individuals and therefore lead to
noticeable increased success probabilities. Another issue is the massive utilisation of JCS particularly in East
Germany. Re°ecting the composition of the participating individuals, a special focus on target groups is not
visible. A clear concentration on the `disadvantaged' and a speci¯c placement of participants with respect to
their quali¯cation might be necessary. This would lead to a reduced number of participants and a clearer focus
on speci¯c target groups. Given that, the additional nature of these schemes might be unnecessarily restrictive.
If JCS are not allowed to compete with regular employment, the bene¯t out of an occupation in these schemes
might not be comparable to real labour market experience either. This might undermine one of its explicit
goals that is the quali¯cation and stabilisation and ¯nally re-integration of the individual into the ¯rst labour
market. However, if the `disadvantages' of the target groups are too strong, an integration into the ¯rst labour
market might be unlikely. In this case JCS might also be used as a `social' policy, e.g. for stabilisation, crime
prevention, etc. Obviously, a clear re-de¯nition of goals and target groups is a necessary precondition for such
a step.
6. Summary and Outlook
This paper presents a microeconometric evaluation of JCS in Germany. We focus on the e®ects on the participat-
ing individuals and take several sources of heterogeneity into account. Since previous empirical studies of these
measures have been based on relatively small datasets, this is the ¯rst study which allows to draw policy-relevant
conclusions. Our estimation is based on a very informative and exhaustive dataset merged from di®erent admin-
istrative sources of the FEA. It contains information on all participants in JCS who started their programme in
February 2000. The pool of variables can be di®erentiated into four categories: Socio-demographic, quali¯cation
and career information as well as regional context-variables to take account of the situation on the local labour
market. The exhaustive and informative dataset at hand justi¯es the conditional independence assumption
30and therefore we applied a matching estimator. Besides avoiding functional form assumptions, this estimator is
intuitively appealing and allows the e®ects to be di®erent in speci¯c sub-populations. Additionally, the multiple
treatment framework is used to take into account sectoral heterogeneity within the analysed programme. We
have also tested the sensitivity of our results with respect to 'hidden bias' and found that some of the results -
especially for the lower bound scenario in West-Germany - might not be robust against this form of bias. Even
though we believe that - given our dataset - the problem of 'hidden bias' is not too severe, interpretation of the
results hinges on this restriction.
The e®ects are estimated separately for men and women in West and East Germany participating in one of the
¯ve biggest sectors of JCS, considering regional, gender-speci¯c and sectoral heterogeneity. To allow additionally
for individual heterogeneity we also estimate the e®ects for various strata of the population, de¯ned by age and
the duration of previous unemployment. Our results show considerable di®erences with respect to these sources
of heterogeneity. However, two things are very common throughout all groups. First, a strong locking-in
e®ect during the ¯rst months of the programmes can be found. Second, although the success probabilities are
increasing in the following, the most striking ¯nding is that no signi¯cant positive e®ects can be established
for any sub-population at the end of our observation period. Clearly, based on these ¯ndings the design and
implementation of JCS has to be revised substantially. Some suggestions, like a shorter duration, a stricter
concentration on speci¯c target groups and more quali¯cation elements are discussed in the paper.
Three main points should be examined in further studies. First, the observation period should be extended
to check if there are any long-term e®ects of JCS which we could not detect yet. It can be argued that the
observation period is too short for the ¯nal identi¯cation of the treatment e®ects, even though this seems to be
unlikely in our view. Second, the used outcome variable does not allow to identify if individuals are re-integrated
into regular employment. Even though this approach is comparable to our de¯nition of the lower bound of the
treatment e®ect, divergences have to be checked as soon as these data are available. Third, the interactions
between active and passive elements of labour market policies should be analysed. It is a relevant question if
JCS set the right incentives for the participating individuals, e.g. concerning monetary aspects. In this context
it would also be interesting to evaluate the e®ects of the programme on the income of participants.
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34A Tables
Table A.1: Selected Descriptives { January 2000 { West-Germany
Non-
Participants
Agriculture Construction
& Industry
O±ce &
Services
Community
Services
Other3
Number 85,195 583 434 348 884 1,132
Means
Programme duration (days)1 { 262.41 276.28 319.11 294.49 281.97
Duration of unempl. (weeks) 72.31 66.79 53.66 63.65 53.13 58.98
Duration of last empl. (months) 64.96 14.82 17.47 29.67 21.26 20.34
Age 42.81 37.76 33.89 40.58 35.85 36.43
Number of placement propositions 3.15 8.14 6.38 8.28 6.25 7.11
German 0.83 0.85 0.86 0.94 0.89 0.83
Last contact to job center 2.46 2.29 2.38 2.72 2.57 2.41
Rehabilitation attendant 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.04
Placement restraints 0.19 0.17 0.13 0.18 0.14 0.15
Women 0.45 0.07 0.09 0.61 0.61 0.26
Work experience 0.91 0.90 0.86 0.83 0.83 0.84
Number of children 0.49 0.50 0.40 0.53 0.52 0.41
Married 0.56 0.36 0.34 0.44 0.35 0.34
Frequencies in %
Occupational group
cultivation, breeding, ¯shery 2.92 16.30 8.06 1.44 2.04 5.74
mining, mineral extraction 0.39 0.34 0.46 0.09
manufacturing 36.35 51.63 62.21 8.05 23.42 47.35
technical professions 3.95 0.86 0.92 9.77 1.36 2.74
service professions 54.33 28.82 24.88 78.45 70.59 40.11
other professions 2.06 2.06 3.46 2.30 2.60 3.98
Professional training (PT)
without compl. PT, without CSE 14.00 33.28 31.34 3.74 12.44 22.53
without compl. PT, with CSE 36.70 37.22 44.01 23.56 37.33 38.87
industrial training 41.30 27.10 22.58 44.25 28.17 28.62
Full-time vocational school 1.60 0.17 0.69 2.87 2.26 0.88
Technical school 2.54 1.03 0.46 6.32 6.11 1.94
Polytechnic 1.17 0.34 0.23 5.75 6.11 2.30
College/ University 2.68 0.86 0.69 13.51 7.58 4.86
Professional rank
worker, not skilled worker 19.88 42.37 35.25 7.47 15.95 25.09
worker, skilled worker 10.36 5.32 6.68 4.02 4.41 7.24
WC2, simple occupations 11.48 2.06 2.76 21.26 15.16 6.63
WC2, advanced occupations 4.39 1.37 0.92 12.07 9.28 4.06
other 53.90 48.89 54.38 55.17 55.20 56.98
Underemployment rate of job center (4. quarter 1999)
< 10% 28.56 23.84 18.66 35.34 32.92 30.04
10%-12,5% 25.03 28.99 15.21 22.13 30.66 23.94
12,5%-15% 34.99 32.76 52.76 29.89 25.68 36.93
>15% 11.42 14.41 13.36 12.64 10.75 9.10
Age classes (in years)
< 25 11.14 19.21 33.87 7.76 25.79 27.56
25-50 53.54 64.49 54.38 73.28 61.09 56.36
> 50 35.32 16.30 11.75 18.97 13.12 16.08
Duration of unemployment in classes (in weeks)
< 13 26.36 24.19 32.26 21.26 27.26 29.15
13-52 33.81 32.25 35.02 36.49 38.69 34.28
> 52 39.83 43.57 32.72 42.24 34.05 36.57
1 The programme duration is measured after the individual has left the programme.
2 WC=white-collar worker
3 The sector `Other' consists of `Forestry', `Tra±c Systems', `Supplemental Construction' and `Other'.
35Table A.2: Selected Descriptives { January 2000 { East-Germany
Non-
Participants
Agriculture Construction
& Industry
O±ce
&Services
Community
Services
Other3
Number 147,204 1,791 595 851 2,229 2,529
Means
Programme duration (days)1 { 326.29 279.10 336.38 334.21 331.71
Duration of unempl. (weeks) 65.93 64.11 53.10 58.50 60.42 58.12
Duration of last empl. (months) 58.75 25.85 20.60 35.13 30.65 27.93
Age 42.71 44.52 42.91 46.10 43.92 43.33
Number of placement propositions 2.80 4.98 6.48 6.33 5.69 5.62
German 0.98 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99
Last contact to job center 2.77 2.59 2.42 2.58 2.60 2.60
Rehabilitation attendant 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.05
Placement restraints 0.14 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.10
Women 0.54 0.51 0.32 0.76 0.81 0.59
Work experience 0.89 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.89 0.89
Number of children 0.53 0.67 0.60 0.65 0.68 0.61
Married 0.57 0.61 0.56 0.75 0.67 0.57
Frequencies in %
Occupational group
cultivation, breeding, ¯shery 5.25 15.69 9.24 2.59 2.65 5.85
mining, mineral extraction 0.15 0.17 0.04
manufacturing 34.57 43.38 58.32 5.64 19.34 34.95
technical professions 4.44 2.90 2.52 16.10 4.49 6.45
service professions 53.16 37.30 29.58 75.68 72.99 51.96
other professions 2.42 0.56 0.34 0.54 0.75
Professional training (PT)
without compl. PT, without CSE 5.60 10.78 9.41 0.59 1.93 5.42
without compl. PT, with CSE 19.96 21.22 18.49 11.87 17.90 22.10
industrial training 66.05 63.87 69.92 57.34 62.27 58.96
Full-time vocational school 0.88 0.78 0.34 1.88 2.47 1.30
Technical school 4.32 1.95 1.34 16.69 10.86 7.83
Polytechnic 0.77 0.45 0.34 3.41 1.17 0.95
College/ University 2.41 0.95 0.17 8.23 3.41 3.44
Professional rank
worker, not skilled worker 20.40 38.19 36.47 12.93 21.44 26.18
worker, skilled worker 21.44 15.35 20.00 15.63 16.60 15.94
WC2, simple occupations 6.69 2.07 2.69 15.86 11.53 9.17
WC2, advanced occupations 1.89 0.78 0.50 3.88 2.47 1.42
other 49.58 43.61 40.34 51.70 47.96 47.29
Underemployment rate of job center (4. quarter 1999)
< 20% 2.45 0.61 2.86 0.82 2.42 3.44
20%-22,5% 6.44 6.20 12.27 10.58 6.42 4.63
22,5%-25% 37.88 27.19 23.19 32.78 36.61 46.30
25%-27,5% 18.31 18.09 25.88 19.27 22.52 12.89
27,5%-30% 23.18 25.68 25.55 26.79 19.61 23.13
> 30% 11.75 22.22 10.25 9.75 12.43 9.61
Age classes (in years)
< 25 11.77 4.58 6.72 1.53 6.10 8.19
25-50 55.04 59.80 64.37 58.99 62.23 59.75
> 50 33.19 35.62 28.91 39.48 31.67 32.07
Duration of unemployment in classes (in weeks)
< 13 24.85 13.46 18.82 14.57 12.74 16.45
13-52 35.19 35.34 41.01 43.48 43.07 40.45
> 52 39.96 51.20 40.17 41.95 44.19 43.10
1 The programme duration is measured after the individual has left the programme.
2 WC=white-collar worker
3 The sector `Other' consists of `Forestry', `Tra±c Systems', `Supplemental Construction' and `Other'.
36Table A.3: Monthly and cumulated programme exits (in %)
West-Germany East-Germany
Men Women Men Women
Month Monthly Cumulated Monthly Cumulated Monthly Cumulated Monthly Cumulated
Mar 00 2.97 2.97 2.58 2.58 1.16 1.16 0.83 0.83
Apr 00 5.14 8.11 3.83 6.41 2.00 3.16 1.19 2.02
May 00 6.82 14.93 3.65 10.06 3.02 6.18 1.70 3.72
Jun 00 5.89 20.82 3.74 13.80 2.55 8.73 1.54 5.26
Jul 00 4.87 25.69 3.74 17.54 2.14 10.87 1.05 6.31
Aug 00 6.16 31.85 7.56 25.10 5.54 16.41 5.09 11.40
Sep 00 4.52 36.37 4.89 29.99 2.58 18.99 1.66 13.06
Oct 00 5.36 41.73 4.18 34.17 5.37 24.36 2.22 15.28
Nov 00 5.14 46.87 4.98 39.15 3.70 28.06 2.95 18.23
Dec 00 4.87 51.74 3.56 42.71 1.97 30.03 1.56 19.79
Jan 01 5.18 56.92 4.27 46.98 1.05 31.08 0.79 20.58
Feb 01 34.65 91.57 39.41 86.39 62.42 93.50 72.51 93.09
Mar 01 1.46 93.03 1.78 88.17 3.84 97.34 4.22 97.31
Apr 01 0.31 93.34 0.18 88.35 0.00 97.34 0.06 97.37
May 01 0.62 93.96 1.16 89.51 0.41 97.75 0.24 97.61
Jun 01 0.27 94.23 0.44 89.95 0.00 97.75 0.04 97.65
Jul 01 0.49 94.72 0.71 90.66 0.07 97.82 0.04 97.69
Aug 01 0.58 95.30 0.18 90.84 0.10 97.92 0.14 97.83
Sep 01 0.22 95.52 0.44 91.28 0.10 98.02 0.00 97.83
Oct 01 0.13 95.65 0.09 91.37 0.00 98.02 0.02 97.85
Nov 01 0.27 95.92 0.27 91.64 0.07 98.09 0.06 97.91
Dec 01 0.62 96.54 0.36 92.00 0.00 98.09 0.02 97.93
Jan 02 0.18 96.72 0.53 92.53 0.00 98.09 0.02 97.95
Feb 02 1.95 98.67 6.85 99.38 1.60 99.69 1.66 99.61
Mar 02 0.09 98.76 0.09 99.47 0.17 99.87 0.08 99.69
Table A.4: Matching Protocol for the estimation of µml
0
Step Description
1 Separate the treated individuals from the non-treated individuals and denote
the group of the treated individuals by m, the group of non-treated by l. Sep-
arate the group of treated individuals into ¯ve groups m 2 f1;:::;5g, according
to the type of treatment they received.
2 Take all individuals in l and the ¯rst group of individuals out of m and estimate
P
mjml. Order the units in the treatment group randomly.
3 Choose one unit out of the treatment group and delete it from the pool.
4 Find an individual in the subsample of individuals in l that is as close as
possible to the one chosen in 3 in terms of the estimated propensity score and
remove this observation.
5 Repeat 3 and 4 until no participant in m is left.
6 Compute the conditional expectation of the matched comparison group.
7 Go back to step 2 and repeat the steps 2-6 for all m.
8 Compute the estimate of the treatment e®ects µ
1l
0 ;µ
2l
0 ;µ
3l
0 ;µ
4l
0 and µ
5l
0 using
the results of 6.
37Table A.5: Probit estimation results for men in West-Germany
Agriculture Constr. &
Industry
O±ce &
Services
Community
Services
Others
vs. Non Participation
Variable Coe®. Coe®. Coe®. Coe®. Coe®.
Constant -2.1362 -1.1336 -5.4904 -1.4569 -1.9879
Socio-Demographic Variables
Age 0.0011 -0.0588 0.1187 -0.0517 -0.0283
Age2 -2.86E-05 0.0006 -0.0014 0.0005 0.0003
Married -0.0919 0.0640 -0.1436 -0.1189 -0.0997
Number of children 0.0385 0.0088 0.0420 0.0420 0.0156
German 0.1859 0.3127 0.1414 0.1441 0.1263
Health restrictions
no health restrictions Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
accepted DoR1, 80% and over 0.4261 -0.2744 1.0743 0.3153 0.2827
accepted DoR, 50% to under 80% 0.3385 -0.0630 0.8938 0.4299 0.2685
accepted DoR, 30% to under 50% 0.5768 | 0.7942 0.6356 0.4030
accepted DoR, 30% to under 50% no equalisation 0.2177 -0.0812 0.5755 0.1112 -0.0155
remaining health restrictions 0.0326 -0.2155 0.1297 -0.0027 -0.0202
Quali¯cation Variables
Professional training
without completed professional training, without CSE Ref. Ref. -0.1987 0.1680 0.2933
without completed professional training, with CSE -0.2404 -0.1405 -0.2378 0.0748 0.1562
Industrial training -0.3635 -0.4029 Ref. Ref. Ref.
Full-time vocational school -0.8761 -0.3305 0.1125 0.2148 -0.1235
Technical school -0.3956 -0.7630 0.3869 0.4931 0.1175
Polytechnic -0.4680 0.3859 0.7472 0.3855
College/ University -0.6130 -0.7308 0.3423 0.5828 0.3444
Occupational group
plant cultivation, breeding, ¯shery 0.3612 0.2311 -0.2451 -0.1867 0.1409
mining, mineral extraction -0.0739 0.0533 | | -0.3048
manufacturing Ref. 0.3186 -0.3145 -0.0503 0.1684
technical professions -0.3619 0.1088 0.1024 -0.3804 -0.0994
service professions -0.1275 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
other professions 0.0612 0.2342 | -0.0952 0.2271
Professional rank
worker, not skilled worker Ref. Ref. -0.1675 -0.1642 -0.0038
worker, skilled worker -0.4108 -0.2570 -0.2505 -0.2384 -0.1289
white-collar worker, simple occupations -0.3360 -0.1932 0.1732 0.0845 0.0269
white-collar worker, advanced occupations -0.0722 -0.2577 0.3421 0.0787 -0.0031
other -0.1234 -0.0484 Ref. Ref. Ref.
Quali¯cation (with work experience) 0.0840 -0.0348 0.2408 0.1146 0.1921
Career Variables
Duration of unemployment (weeks) 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0003
Duration of last employment (months) -0.0021 -0.0010 -0.0015 -0.0013 -0.0012
Number of placement propositions 0.0257 0.0188 0.0237 0.0198 0.0249
Last contact to job center -0.0090 -0.0153 0.0436 0.0134 0.0039
Rehabilitation attendant -0.0486 0.1397 0.0542 0.0386 -0.2161
Placement restraints -0.2163 0.0715 -0.4175 -0.0959 -0.0306
Programme before unemployment
no further education or job-preparative programme Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
further education compl. successfully, cont. education 0.0893 0.2039 0.1271 0.0338 0.0848
further education compl. successfully, voc. adjustment 0.3363 0.4125 -0.0594 | 0.3738
job-preparative measure 0.3617 0.2956 | | 0.0796
job creation scheme 0.9458 1.1101 0.9000 0.9192 1.0393
rehabilitation measure -0.0976 -0.0651 0.1854 -0.1974 0.1111
Regional Variables
Size of labour o±ce district (labour force)
to 150.000 Ref. -0.0479 0.0647 0.1925 -0.1409
150.000 to under 250.000 -0.0814 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
250.000 to under 350.000 -0.4063 0.1285 -0.2426 0.0382 0.0480
350.000 to under 450.000 -0.1612 -0.0264 0.0202 0.1708 0.0277
Table continued on the following page
38Table A.5: continued
Agriculture Constr. &
Industry
O±ce &
Services
Community
Services
Others
vs. Non Participation
Variable Coe®. Coe®. Coe®. Coe®. Coe®.
450.000 and over -0.3101 -0.2739 -0.0522 0.1845 -0.0010
Underemployment rate of labour o±ce district (4. quarter 1999)
< 10% Ref. -0.3122 Ref. Ref. Ref.
10%-12,5% 0.1432 -0.3673 -0.1285 -0.1713 -0.0587
12,5%-15% 0.0523 Ref. -0.2173 -0.3479 -0.1116
>15% 0.0019 -0.1849 0.1454 -0.2088 -0.2268
No. of observations2 540 393 136 349 859
Bold letters indicate signi¯cance at the 1% level, Italic letters refer to the 5% level.
1 DoR=Degree of restriction
2 No. of observations contains only participants. Corresponding no. of non-participants is 47,236.
Ref.=Reference category for probit estimation
| Category has been omitted from estimation
Table A.6: Probit estimation results for women in West-Germany(a)
Agriculture Constr. &
Industry
O±ce &
Services
Community
Services
Others
vs. Non Participation
Variable Coe®. Coe®. Coe®. Coe®. Coe®.
Constant -3.4513 -2.3926 -1.5896
Socio-Demographic Variables
Age 0.0454 -0.0181 -0.0252
Age2 -0.0006 0.0001 0.0002
Married -0.0296 -0.2047 -0.2026
Number of children -0.0215 0.0389 -0.0352
German 0.1121 0.1159 0.0946
Health restrictions
no health restrictions Ref. Ref. Ref.
accepted DoR1, 80% and over 0.7754 0.5711 0.4369
accepted DoR, 50% to under 80% 0.5151 0.0872 0.2998
accepted DoR, 30% to under 50% 1.0982 0.7195 0.8150
accepted DoR, 30% to under 50% no equalisation -0.0432 0.0301 -0.0229
remaining health restrictions -0.1788 0.0012 -0.0726
Quali¯cation Variables
Professional training
without completed professional training, without CSE -0.5191 0.0635 0.0858
without completed professional training, with CSE 0.0245 0.1650 0.1080
industrial training Ref. Ref. Ref.
Full-time vocational school -0.1043 0.1197 -0.0871
Technical school -0.0175 0.4850 0.1860
Polytechnic 0.4115 0.8784 0.6011
College/ University 0.5070 0.4027 0.4930
Occupational group
plant cultivation, breeding, ¯shery | -0.1635 0.2318
mining, mineral extraction | | |
manufacturing -0.5789 Ref. 0.1733
technical professions 0.1588 -0.6313 0.0816
service professions Ref. 0.2679 Ref.
other professions 0.3406 0.1832 0.2094
Professional rank
worker, not skilled worker -0.3465 0.0379 -0.0857
worker, skilled worker -0.2474 -0.0736 -0.2119
white-collar worker, simple occupations Ref. 0.0603 -0.1544
white-collar worker, advanced occupations -0.1232 0.3136 0.0288
other -0.1265 Ref. Ref.
Quali¯cation (with work experience) 0.1698 0.1013 -0.0022
Career Variables
Duration of unemployment (weeks) -0.0012 -0.0007 -0.0003
Table continued on the following page
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Agriculture Constr. &
Industry
O±ce &
Services
Community
Services
Others
vs. Non Participation
Variable Coe®. Coe®. Coe®. Coe®. Coe®.
Duration of last employment (months) -0.0002 -0.0011 -0.0014
Number of placement propositions 0.0296 0.0213 0.0250
Last contact to job center 0.0248 0.0329 -0.0163
Rehabilitation attendant -0.0487 0.0624 0.3013
Placement restraints -0.1253 -0.0848 -0.1797
Programme before unemployment
no further education or job-preparative programme Ref. Ref. Ref.
further education compl. successfully, cont. education 0.4274 0.2386 0.0607
further education compl. successfully, voc. adjustment 0.3168 0.0998 0.3932
job-preparative measure | 1.4814 0.5991
job creation scheme 1.4912 1.5696 1.2716
rehabilitation measure 1.0426 0.1966 0.1056
Regional Variables
Size of labour o±ce district (labour force)
to 150.000 -0.0896 0.0156 -0.2729
150.000 to under 250.000 Ref. Ref. -0.1738
250.000 to under 350.000 -0.2225 0.1778 -0.1265
350.000 to under 450.000 -0.2594 0.1901 -0.2658
450.000 and over -0.0775 0.0323 Ref.
Underemployment rate of labour o±ce district (4. quarter 1999)
< 10% Ref. Ref. Ref.
10%-12,5% -0.0885 0.1159 -0.2358
12,5%-15% -0.1400 -0.1519 -0.0604
>15% -0.3618 -0.0509 -0.3034
No. of observations2 212 535 239
(a) Due to the small number of participants the sectors agriculture and construction & industry have been omitted.
Bold letters indicate signi¯cance at the 1% level, Italic letters refer to the 5% level.
1 DoR=Degree of restriction
2 No. of observations contains only participants. Corresponding no. of non-participants is 37,959.
Ref.=Reference category for probit estimation
| Category has been omitted from estimation
40Table A.7: Probit estimation results for men in East-Germany
Agriculture Constr. &
Industry
O±ce &
Services
Community
Services
Others
vs. Non Participation
Variable Coe®. Coe®. Coe®. Coe®. Coe®.
Constant -3.6252 -3.6638 -5.0056 -3.2208 -2.7295
Socio-Demographic Variables
Age 0.0481 0.0574 0.0824 0.0068 0.0157
Age2 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0001 -0.0001
Married 0.0677 0.0803 0.2413 0.2496 0.0392
Number of children -0.0039 -0.0170 -0.0402 -0.0487 0.0038
German 0.3558 0.3317 | 0.2459 0.2545
Health restrictions
no health restrictions Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
accepted DoR1, 80% and over 0.3524 | 0.3396 0.4010 0.1020
accepted DoR, 50% to under 80% 0.0605 0.1603 0.4490 0.2706 0.2921
accepted DoR, 30% to under 50% 0.0249 0.3366 0.3164 0.4002 0.3459
accepted DoR, 30% to under 50% no equalisation 0.0961 -0.0341 0.2099 0.0484 -0.2111
remaining health restrictions -0.0535 -0.0043 -0.1452 -0.0294 -0.0346
Quali¯cation Variables
Professional training
without completed professional training, without CSE 0.1844 0.0766 -0.2373 -0.1303 0.0732
without completed professional training, with CSE 0.1317 0.0513 0.0133 0.0487 0.1841
Industrial training Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Full-time vocational school -0.2414 | 0.1168 0.2836 0.0237
Technical school -0.0973 -0.3702 0.5314 0.2402 0.1883
Polytechnic -0.3764 -0.1381 0.2445 0.3508 0.0775
College/ University -0.2791 -0.7474 0.3577 0.2957 0.1271
Occupational group
plant cultivation, breeding, ¯shery 0.1609 -0.1701 -0.2881 -0.3725 -0.0765
mining, mineral extraction -0.0371 | | | -0.3469
manufacturing Ref. Ref. -0.5333 -0.1176 Ref.
technical professions -0.2018 -0.2644 0.2360 -0.1024 -0.1456
service professions -0.1570 -0.3038 Ref. Ref. -0.0472
other professions -0.2553 -0.8850 | -0.3939 -0.3892
Professional rank
worker, not skilled worker Ref. -0.0006 -0.0468 Ref. 0.1009
worker, skilled worker -0.1485 -0.1313 -0.0351 0.0674 Ref.
white-collar worker, simple occupations -0.2129 0.0305 0.2165 0.2101 0.2129
white-collar worker, advanced occupations -0.1219 0.0697 -0.0061 0.2941 -0.2612
other -0.0016 Ref. Ref. 0.1325 0.1187
Quali¯cation (with work experience) -0.0493 -0.0244 0.2347 0.1917 0.1580
Career Variables
Duration of unemployment (weeks) 1.52E-05 -0.0003 -0.0011 -0.0009 -0.0004
Duration of last employment (months) -0.0010 -0.0013 -0.0016 -0.0018 -0.0012
Number of placement propositions 0.0237 0.0296 0.0364 0.0259 0.0308
Last contact to job center -0.0420 -0.0417 -0.0210 -0.0141 -0.0482
Rehabilitation attendant 0.0325 0.0810 0.0911 0.3556 0.1241
Placement restraints -0.1402 -0.1884 -0.0871 -0.0619 -0.1427
Programme before unemployment
no further education or job-preparative programme Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
further education compl. successfully, cont. education 0.2270 0.2069 0.4175 0.1849 0.1434
further education compl. successfully, voc. adjustment 0.3206 0.3279 0.1198 0.3940 0.3005
job-preparative measure | 0.6743 | 0.6923 0.1349
job creation scheme 0.7968 0.7235 0.6202 0.8904 0.8237
rehabilitation measure | 0.1073 0.4903 0.0732 0.3017
Regional Variables
Size of labour o±ce district (labour force)
to 150.000 -0.0938 Ref. Ref. -0.0705 -0.8443
150.000 to under 250.000 Ref. -0.3956 -0.2123 Ref. -0.5855
250.000 to under 350.000 -0.1225 -0.5321 -0.1230 -0.0893 -0.4153
350.000 to under 450.000 -0.3225 | -0.5979 -0.3445 Ref.
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Agriculture Constr. &
Industry
O±ce &
Services
Community
Services
Others
vs. Non Participation
Variable Coe®. Coe®. Coe®. Coe®. Coe®.
450.000 and over | | | | |
Underemployment rate of labour o±ce district (4. quarter 1999)
< 20% -0.5478 0.3090 -0.0310 0.2031
20%-22,5% -0.2194 -0.0387 0.2270 -0.1530 -0.2433
22,5%-25% -0.2535 -0.0535 Ref. 0.0131 -0.0481
25%-27,5% -0.2514 -0.0635 0.0589 -0.0052 -0.2971
27,5%-30% -0.0676 Ref. 0.1779 Ref. Ref.
> 30% Ref. -0.2826 0.0795 -0.3190 -0.0517
No. of observations2 870 407 202 414 1,050
Bold letters indicate signi¯cance at the 1% level, Italic letters refer to the 5% level.
1 DoR=Degree of restriction
2 No. of observations contains only participants. Corresponding no. of non-participants is 67,187.
Ref.=Reference category for probit estimation
| Category has been omitted from estimation
Table A.8: Probit estimation results for women in East-Germany
Agriculture Constr. &
Industry
O±ce &
Services
Community
Services
Others
vs. Non Participation
Variable Coe®. Coe®. Coe®. Coe®. Coe®.
Constant -4.1795 -3.2795 -5.5024 -4.4953 -4.0081
Socio-Demographic Variables
Age 0.0679 0.0296 0.1066 0.0758 0.0540
Age2 -0.0008 -0.0003 -0.0012 -0.0008 -0.0006
Married 0.0534 0.0282 0.1166 0.0696 -0.0231
Number of children 0.0050 0.0149 -0.0163 -0.0173 -0.0020
German 0.5349 0.0433 0.5262 0.5384 0.3211
Health restrictions
no health restrictions Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
accepted DoR1, 80% and over 0.2830 0.3897 0.0667 0.5334 0.5591
accepted DoR, 50% to under 80% -0.1553 | 0.5632 0.2311 0.2289
accepted DoR, 30% to under 50% -0.0858 0.1180 0.3681 0.3958 0.3179
accepted DoR, 30% to under 50% no equalisation -0.1120 | -0.1083 0.1608 -0.2554
remaining health restrictions -0.1357 -0.0631 0.0153 -0.0536 -0.0046
Quali¯cation Variables
Professional training
without completed professional training, without CSE 0.1310 0.1566 -0.9507 -0.4526 -0.1225
without completed professional training, with CSE 0.0443 -0.0781 -0.1132 -0.0012 0.0456
Industrial training Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Full-time vocational school 0.0963 -0.0030 0.1683 0.3450 0.1373
Technical school -0.2693 -0.2176 0.2911 0.3781 0.3035
Polytechnic 0.1360 | 0.5345 0.2683 0.1850
College/ University -0.1583 | 0.4612 0.1375 0.2337
Occupational group
plant cultivation, breeding, ¯shery 0.5078 0.3728 -0.3318 -0.3692 0.0890
mining, mineral extraction | | | | |
manufacturing 0.2565 0.1826 -0.6076 -0.1589 0.1069
technical professions 0.1402 0.1712 0.1851 -0.1560 0.2544
service professions Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
other professions -0.4788 -0.1391 -0.3788 -0.2937
Professional rank
worker, not skilled worker Ref. Ref. -0.2871 Ref. Ref.
worker, skilled worker -0.1744 -0.1306 Ref. 0.0811 0.0113
white-collar worker, simple occupations -0.3843 -0.1801 0.0799 0.1530 0.1451
white-collar worker, advanced occupations -0.1637 0.1199 0.1190 -0.0234
other -0.0410 -0.1515 -0.0228 0.0451 0.0646
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Agriculture Constr. &
Industry
O±ce &
Services
Community
Services
Others
vs. Non Participation
Variable Coe®. Coe®. Coe®. Coe®. Coe®.
Quali¯cation (with work experience) 0.0117 -0.1296 -0.0308 0.0607 0.0825
Career Variables
Duration of unemployment (weeks) -0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0016 -0.0014 -0.0012
Duration of last employment (months) -0.0010 -0.0011 -0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0010
Number of placement propositions 0.0318 0.0416 0.0452 0.0451 0.0433
Last contact to job center -0.0268 -0.0408 -0.0198 -0.0234 -0.0211
Rehabilitation attendant -0.1187 0.1562 0.0859 0.1660 0.0570
Placement restraints -0.1407 -0.0177 -0.2287 -0.0542 -0.1378
Programme before unemployment
no further education or job-preparative programme Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
further education compl. successfully, cont. education 0.1049 -0.0038 0.3727 0.2580 0.1801
further education compl. successfully, voc. adjustment 0.2719 0.2183 0.2752 0.2098 0.1957
job-preparative measure 0.3043 | | 0.4073 |
job creation scheme 0.5608 0.3726 0.7931 0.7380 0.7204
rehabilitation measure 0.2969 0.2886 0.1495 0.0510
Regional Variables
Size of labour o±ce district (labour force)
to 150.000 -0.0398 Ref. 0.2690 Ref. Ref.
150.000 to under 250.000 Ref. -0.6235 Ref. 0.0364 0.1357
250.000 to under 350.000 -0.0972 -0.1615 0.1981 -0.0097 0.3104
350.000 to under 450.000 -0.2541 -0.9115 -0.5440 -0.4799 0.5514
450.000 and over | | | | |
Underemployment rate of labour o±ce district (4. quarter 1999)
< 20% -0.4675 0.1198 -0.3689 0.2453 -0.0372
20%-22,5% -0.3045 0.3653 0.1476 0.0003 -0.0116
22,5%-25% -0.2429 0.0075 0.0258 0.1069 -0.0912
25%-27,5% -0.1725 0.4083 -0.0272 0.1206 -0.0720
27,5%-30% -0.1068 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
> 30% Ref. 0.3828 -0.0293 0.0884 -0.0656
No. of observations2 921 188 649 1,815 1,479
Bold letters indicate signi¯cance at the 1% level, Italic letters refer to the 5% level.
1 DoR=Degree of restriction
2 No. of observations contains only participants. Corresponding no. of non-participants is 80,017.
Ref.=Reference category for probit estimation
| Category has been omitted from estimation
43B Figures
Figure B.1: Success Probabilities for Women in West Germany
(Lower and Upper Bounds, with 95% con¯dence levels)
Women: O±ce & other Services Women: Community Services
Women: Other
44Figure B.2: Success Probabilities for Men in West Germany
(Lower and Upper Bounds, with 95% con¯dence levels)
Men: Agriculture Men: Construction & Industry
Men: O±ce & other Services Men: Community Services
Men: Other
45Figure B.3: Success Probabilities for Women in East Germany
(Lower and Upper Bounds, with 95% con¯dence levels)
Women: Agriculture Women: Construction & Industry
Women: O±ce & other Services Women: Community Services
Women: Other
46Figure B.4: Success Probabilities for Men in East Germany
(Lower and Upper Bounds, with 95% con¯dence levels)
Men: Agriculture Men: Construction & Industry
Men: O±ce & other Services Men: Community Services
Men: Other
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